University Government in Canada

Report of a Commission
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Foreword

THIS REPORT is an objective and considered attempt to illuminate a problem that deeply concerns all those who work in universities, whether as teachers, students, or administrators. Indeed, the concern goes far beyond the university to embrace the increasing numbers of those in government, in business, and in other educational activities who are associated with universities in a variety of ways.

The two Commissioners have come well prepared to their work. Sir James Duff has been Vice-Chancellor for many years of a British university, and he has served on many important educational commissions throughout the world. Professor Berdahl is an American political scientist who has written a major book on the relationship in the United Kingdom between universities and government. In the Report there is thus a mingling of two of the principal educational traditions in the Western world. Although the Report benefits from their diverse traditions, there is throughout an obvious agreement on fundamental principles. For those of us who saw the Commissioners in action and worked with them, the Report fulfils our expectations in its liveliness, directness, and brevity.

Many of the recommendations will arouse vigorous controversy, and this, I am sure, will please the Commissioners. They are not convinced that they have adumbrated perfection, and even if, by some miracle, they had, they know that no academic community would accept perfection without amendment.

This Report has been sponsored by the entire university community of Canada. It was in June, 1962, that the National Conference of Canadian Universities and Colleges (now known as the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada) warmly endorsed a recommendation from the Canadian Association of University Teachers to undertake a study of Canadian university government. Subsequently the Ford

Foundation made a grant towards the financing of the study. I am happy to express our gratitude to the Ford Foundation both for the generosity of its response and for its philosophic understanding of the problems we faced in launching the study. The Steering Committee was made up of two representatives from the National Conference of Canadian Universities and Colleges and two from the Canadian Association of University Teachers. There were from time to time some changes in its membership, but at the time of the completion of the Report the Committee consisted of the following members:

President Claude Bissell (Chairman)
Dr. Edward F. Sheffield
Professor Jacques St.-Pierre
Professor J. Percy Smith (Secretary).

The deliberations of the Committee were harmonious and its decisions not untouched by wisdom.

Although the Report is a document that issues from the whole university community, it could not have come into existence without the work of one man. That man is Stewart Reid, who was the Executive Secretary of the Canadian Association of University Teachers when the proposal was first developed, and who was largely responsible for the formulation that brought wide support. His death shortly after the formation of the Commission was a grievous blow to our enterprise, and a tragic loss to the whole Canadian university community. The Report is only one of many activities upon which he left his impress, but I like to think that he would have given it a special pride of place.

CLAUDE BISSELL

January 11, 1966

Preface

THE ORIGINAL COMMISSIONERS were appointed and held their first meeting in November 1963. The senior Commissioner, Sir James Mountford, was subsequently compelled to resign for reasons of health and was replaced in July 1964 by Sir James Duff.

After a preliminary meeting with the Joint Steering Committee of N.C.C.U.C. (now the A.U.C.C.) and C.A.U.T. in November 1964, we visited universities throughout Canada from the end of January to early April 1965. Our itinerary is given in Appendix II.

We extend sincere thanks to the members of our Steering Committee: Dr. Claude Bissell (Chairman) and Dr. Edward Sheffield from the A.U.C.C.; and Professors Bora Laskin, Jacques St.-Pierre, and J. Percy Smith (Secretary) from the C.A.U.T. Professor Smith in particular and the members of his staff in Ottawa helped us throughout our itinerary by seeing that the relevant mail and documents were always at hand and where we needed them.

Our sincere thanks also go to our hosts at all the universities which we visited for their unfailing kindness and hospitality. We hope that they will realize that it is only because they were so many that we do not mention them by name. In particular, at French-language universities, we were delighted to find that our very moderate degree of bilingual skill did not inhibit mutual understanding and that our hosts were so ready to meet us more than halfway.

We are grateful for the advice on points of fact in their respective countries which we sought from Sir Eric Ashby (Clare College, Cambridge), President Clark Kerr (University of California), and President Wallace Sterling and Professor W. H. Cowley (Stanford University). They have no responsibility for our conclusions.

To our personal secretary, Miss Ann Christopherson, goes deep appreciation for services well rendered in both Durham and California.

August, 1965

R.O.B.
J.F.D.

Contents

Definitions

FOR THE SAKE OF SIMPLICITY we use a single term throughout this report for each of the main bodies found in universities. There is considerable divergence between universities in respect of almost all these titles.

BOARD. The legally supreme governing body of a university.

SENATE. The highest academic body in the university.

CONSEIL. The governing body found in some Catholic universities which to some extent combines the functions of Board and Senate.

PRESIDENT. The chief executive officer of a university.*

FACULTY. Everywhere used in two senses: one, the whole body of the academic staff (in this sense always printed in our report without a capital letter); two, a group of cognate subjects within a university, e.g. Faculty of Arts, Faculty of Medicine (in this sense always printed with a capital letter).

DEPARTMENT CHAIRMAN. The administrative head of a department, i.e. a single field of study. Some universities use "Head" instead of "Chairman." The latter perhaps conveys better the sense that he is *primus inter pares.*

FACULTY ASSOCIATION. The professional organization of members of staff of a university, autonomous, but normally affiliated to the Canadian Association of University Teachers. At some universities its name is Staff Association.

*Other titles are found: Principal (Scottish-derived), Recteur (French-derived), Vice-Chancellor (English-derived). Some have seen in the title of President a derivation from the United States' universities or even from the chief executive of a business corporation. But in fact President has for centuries been the title of the heads of some Oxford and Cambridge Colleges.

1. Introduction

OUR COMMISSION WAS SET UP jointly by the National Conference of Canadian Universities and Colleges* and the Canadian Association of University Teachers, and has been financed by a grant from the Ford Foundation. Its primary purpose was stated to be "a dispassionate examination and evaluation of the present structure and practices of the government of both the English- and French-language universities of Canada, including provincial, church-related and independent institutions."

The hope was specifically expressed that the study would examine the charges that one so often hears today, that universities are becoming so large, so complex, and so dependent upon public funds that scholars no longer form or even influence their own policy, that a new and rapidly growing class of administrators is assuming control, and that a gulf of misunderstanding and misapprehension is widening between the academic staff and the administrative personnel, with grave damage to the functioning of both.

As peripatetic visitors we could not watch the actual workings of the governmental structure at any university. We had to rely on our previous study of the written constitutions and of the briefs submitted to us by many bodies in many universities in advance of our visits. Then, on the spot, we had separate sessions with the President, with members of the Board, of the administration, of Senate or its equivalent, and with the committees of the faculty associations, and sometimes with student representatives, though the students made their main representations to us centrally, the French-speaking students in Montreal, the English-speaking students in Ottawa. We were also given interviews by either the Premier or the Minister for Education in most of the provinces. Every kind of information that we asked for was readily forthcoming.

We listened, we questioned, and we learnt. Tensions certainly exist but this is not a state of things peculiar to Canadian Universities. Nor

*Since Aug. 1, 1965, the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada.

is it necessary to deplore their existence. A university totally free from tensions would be totally lifeless. In a few universities, however, tensions seemed dangerously severe. But the main cause of them does not lie in personalities but in the defective structure of university government, as we shall elaborate throughout our Report.

The universities of Canada differ considerably from each other, not only in size or in age but in type. We recognize that our proposals will not be equally applicable in all respects to all universities. Nonetheless, we feel that the root causes of difficulty are to some extent present throughout the structure of all the universities which we visited, and we have attempted to make our generalizations on that basis.

2. General Survey and Prospect

A. EXISTING PRACTICES SUMMARIZED

THERE IS NO SINGLE THEORY of university government which embraces the variety of existing practices in Canada. But if we put aside church-affiliated colleges and universities, which are discussed separately in chapter 11, and generalize only about the larger ones among those remaining, the following are roughly accurate statements.

Most universities are governed on the basis of an assumed separation of powers, the lay Board of Governors ostensibly confining its attentions to fiscal matters while giving the necessary *pro forma* legal approval to educational policies coming up from a Senate which is theoretically representative of academic interests.

The lay Boards are usually put together by a mixed process of self-perpetuation and governmental selection, with the former predominating at private institutions and the latter at provincial universities. In most cases there is also provision for election of a sizeable minority of the board membership by the Alumni organization. Members of the faculty are often explicitly excluded from membership.

The Senates, on the other hand, are usually far from being the exclusive preserves of the teaching staff. In addition to a very heavy *ex officio* administrative membership (President, Vice-Presidents, Deans, and sometimes Department Heads), a significant proportion of their members is drawn from one or more of the following categories:

(1) alumni representatives,
(2) outside persons with special interests in higher education, e.g. representatives of professions and secondary schools,
(3) appointees of the provincial government, e.g. a senior civil servant in the education ministry,
(4) board members (at only a few universities).

While in theory the Senate at most universities is in complete charge

of educational policy, in practice it often defers to the Board for leadership in university expansion and development, and to strictly internal bodies like General Faculty Councils or the various Faculty Boards for *de facto* approval of curriculum matters. We were frequently told that the Senate as at present constituted acts chiefly as a "rubber-stamp" for routine approval of relatively minor business.

At most universities the President acts as the sole link between the Board and the Senate. On occasion the President may be accompanied before the Board by some of his Vice-Presidents and/or Deans, but since they are answerable to him this does not alter the basic fact of the President's unique role. It is his duty to explain to the Board the academic policies recommended by the Senate and to inform the Senate of relevant Board actions. He is supposed to keep the Board from intruding into educational policy and the Senate from dealing with financial matters.

Most Boards have become dependent on strong presidential leadership. Some of them meet only infrequently and non-local Board members are often unavailable for interim consultation and committee work. Some Board members commented on their lack of acquaintance with current campus problems and personalities, and on their corresponding need to rely nearly exclusively on presidential reporting.

The President usually plays an equally strong role with respect to the Senate, and, if one exists, to the General Faculty Council. He is not only the presiding officer but, since these bodies usually function with a minority of elected academics, with heavy *ex officio* administrative membership, and often, in the case of Senates, with sizeable numbers of "outsiders," the President and the administrative group usually dominate them. Executive committees, agenda arrangements, and committee nominations often pass, sometimes by default, under the control of the President and his administrative group. Moreover, members of some Senates noted that their need for information regarding Board action and thinking made them quite dependent on presidential leadership.

The members of the President's administrative group tend to become permanent full-time administrators because of the President's heavy dependence on them. And he *can* safely lean on them because they have become experienced officers, well versed in university affairs and loyal to their chief executive. The typical President is so burdened by his Board and Senate duties and by his need to act in the outside community as the university's public relations officer that he must, of necessity, delegate a great number of administrative tasks to his Vice-Presidents and Deans. He is also tempted to use them as his actual advisory com-

mittee on academic affairs instead of waiting on the slower process of Senate deliberations.

Presidents are appointed by the Boards in all but three cases, and in these the provincial governments have at least the *de jure* power. Very rarely is there legal provision for consultation with the Senate on the choice of a new President, who normally holds office indefinitely during the pleasure of the Board or up to a fixed retiring age.

The Vice-Presidents, Deans, and Department Heads are appointed by the Boards on the recommendation of the President and normally serve for indefinite terms at the President's pleasure. Some universities have well-established traditions of consulting Faculties and departments before the appointment of their academic leaders, but the practice is far from universal.

Students sit on joint student-professor consultative committees in departments and Faculties at several universities. At least one university has student representation on its Senate and several more have students sitting on some of their Senate committees. Finally, one university has adopted the Scottish practice by which students elect from outside their own number a Rector who has a seat on the Board *ex officio*. But the prevailing practice in most Canadian universities is to confine student contact with university government to the President and his administrative associates.

B. EVALUATION OF EXISTING PRACTICES

WE AGREE WITH the Canadian university President who commented that it is ludicrous to picture the Canadian academic scene as something resembling a Siberian prison camp in contrast with the supposed glow of billboard academic health in the United Kingdom. Certainly the universities which we visited displayed an impressive amount of vitality and, given the problems they are currently facing of rapid physical expansion and burgeoning enrolments, the government processes seem to be reasonably efficient. Some Boards of Governors are clearly anxious to stay within the theoretical limits of their powers; most university Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Deans have been recruited from academic ranks and cannot be regarded by the faculty as outsiders; and in a few universities we found fairly well-functioning Senates.

Nevertheless, the over-all impression we received was of unnecessarily high degrees of tension within the larger institutions, and of a fairly widespread desire on the part of the smaller universities to expand and

inherit the problems of their larger sisters. Therefore, in view of the present difficulties of governing Canadian universities, and in anticipation of those which may arise in the course of the next decade, we strongly believe that the present systems need reform.

We discovered conditions requiring reform at each of the three major loci of university government—the Board, the Senate, and the Presidency, and these conditions promise to get worse as the Canadian universities undergo major changes in the coming years.

1. *The Boards of Governors*

We found these Boards to be somewhat too homogeneous in membership. This condition is not surprising in view of the fact that most of these Board members had been recruited with the functions of fund-raising and financial management as major selection criteria. Yet the reality as we perceived it is that these Boards are on the one hand getting more involved, willy nilly, in questions of educational policy which are theoretically outside their jurisdiction, while on the other hand their duties as fund-raisers and estate managers are, ironically enough, growing relatively less important. This latter condition relates, of course, to the fact that universities are deriving larger proportions of their income for both operating and capital expenses from governmental sources, and these sources are, in turn, relying increasingly on the advice of university advisory committees whose operations serve to lessen, at least to some extent, the fiscal discretion of the Boards of Governors. The theory that the lay Board controls finance and the academic Senate controls academic policy may perhaps have worked in times gone by where budgets were stationary from year to year and academic forward policy was perforce at a standstill; but today finance and academic planning are quite inevitably and quite inextricably linked with each other, and will be even more so in the future.

2. *The Academic Senate*

The two-tiered system can work well only if the Senate is both able and willing to play its full part. It should be the responsible, representative voice of the whole academic community on all, literally all, questions of university policy. By whatever method, the Senate must ensure that its voice is heard by the Board, and that it is sufficiently well informed, by the Board, President, and other agencies, to be realistic in its recommendations. The greatness of a university depends, not mainly on its size nor on its wealth, but on the quality of its faculty and the measure of their collective wisdom. A President can and should

give a lead to the faculty. But unless the Senate is rightly composed and rightly organized for the work it has to do, even the best of Presidents will fail to bring the university up to its full potential.

We say with regret that all too few of the universities that we visited in Canada have really effective Senates. This is not the fault of individuals or of individual bodies—Board, President, Faculty Association, or Senate itself. It is the system which is at fault, in different ways in different universities, as we shall proceed to explain. But we have formed the firm opinion that the ineffectiveness of Senates is the major cause of the tension and disharmony that exist today, not in all but in far too many Canadian universities.

Some Senates are unable to fulfil their intended function as the voice of the faculty because they are too large or too heavily diluted with non-academic members, or because too few (sometimes literally none) of their members are elected by the faculty as those whom they wish to represent them.

Even in universities which are running without friction, members of Senate told us that the Senate business is largely formal, and that most of the real business is done at the level of individual Faculties. Even where several Faculties are concerned, they will "try to settle the business as between the Faculties" and not at Senate. This seems to us wrong in principle, however convenient. Administrative discretion at Faculty level is right. But central co-ordination at Senate level is needed when policy questions arise having university-wide impact (e.g. standards of appointment, promotion, and tenure, determination of budgetary priorities for new programmes as between Faculties).

An opinion expressed at some of the strongest universities was, in effect, that "Senate had the power but lacked the 'guts' to use it." When we asked why, the commonest answer was that the "administrative group" on Senate (President, Vice-Presidents, Deans) is predominant and tends to speak with one voice. Even if this group does not form a majority of the academics on Senate, the elected members are inclined to feel that their own intervention is unwelcome. It may well be that the administrators are too busy to welcome discussions of policy. But the President should realize that this is a defect, however inevitable, in his administrative group, and should not rely solely on them for forward planning and new ideas. Their task of keeping the machine running, is difficult enough without that.

It was also said in many universities that the Senate agenda is normally of great length (we saw samples running to hundreds of pages), and almost wholly composed of formal business from Faculties and

committees, all of which had to be passed through Senate lest one item in a hundred needed further discussion. Consequently, even if an elected member has succeeded in placing a policy-question on the agenda, it will not be reached until the meeting has gone on so long that the members' one overwhelming desire is to go home.

A more serious cause was adduced for the despondency of Senates at their lack of effectiveness ("despair" was the word used at one university). The theory that the Board is in complete control of finance can be and sometimes is interpreted by the Board and/or the President to mean that any academic policy involving expenditure, or even an order of priority between academic projects, is *ultra vires* for the Senate. The faculty complaints which we heard were an indication that such a treatment is already deeply resented, and one can anticipate that the growing shortage of qualified faculty will make it increasingly hard to recruit and retain the better faculty at institutions which operate along these lines.

3. *The Presidency*

The present system seems to depend to an excessive degree for its successful functioning on the superhuman talents of the President. Unfortunately most Presidents are only human. There are probably few other offices in public or private life that place higher demands on their occupants. A great deal of this pressure is, of course, inevitable, for universities are complex expensive organisms which require expert administrative leadership. But we are convinced that the present structure makes the President's position worse than it need be, and that this excessive pressure in turn produces other tension-inducing faults in the system. In particular, the President's role as a one-man link between Board and Senate adds an intolerable burden to the office. Few Presidents have found ways of strengthening the Board-Senate link, to improve the mutual education of both bodies. Some Presidents, indeed, masochistically believing that they ought to carry the burden of mutual misunderstanding between the two bodies on their own shoulders, deliberately keep them apart from each other.

The facts that the President in effect appoints most Vice-Presidents and Deans to serve at his pleasure, that he must of necessity delegate so many duties to them that they become full-time administrative officers, and that he has tended by choice to rely on them heavily for academic guidance instead of using the slower Senate channels—all these things tend to make the teaching faculty regard the entire administrative hierarchy as a distant and impersonal monolith over which they have neither control nor influence.

C. LOOKING AHEAD

IF TENSION LEVELS are already high at many Canadian universities, it seems likely that future developments will only serve to heighten them. The rapid rate of expansion planned for higher education in most provinces points to increasing pressures on the President to obtain rapid decisions at the very time that the teaching faculties are asking for more and more of a share in these decisions. The growing shortage of qualified faculty will strengthen the hand of those teachers who are seeking to be treated as members of a "community of scholars" rather than as mere employees of the Board. For example, faculty demands will probably become more insistent for a larger share in the process of appointing their Department Chairmen, Deans, and senior university officers. Furthermore, some faculties are attracting to their university substantial grants for research. These are due to the distinction of the faculty members concerned and not to the money-raising efforts of the Board. In such cases members of faculty must necessarily be involved in financial decisions.

Student discontent in other countries and testimony that we heard in Canada both point to the probability of growing student demands for participation in university government; and those Presidents, Boards, and Senates who are insensitive to their grievances may find student negotiating tactics becoming increasingly unpalatable.

Finally, as a variable related to rapidity of expansion but separate from it, the problem of sheer size may make the governance of universities still harder and cause excessive tensions in some institutions which seem relatively stable now. We know the advantages and probably even the inevitability of larger universities, but we must note here the fact that relations between Board and Senate, between President and faculty, between students and faculty, and between students and administration—all seem to deteriorate as a university grows into a total of many thousands. Communication becomes more difficult; face-to-face negotiations more rare; a sense of identification with the institution more difficult both for students and for faculty. We are not sociologists and hence shall not explore the phenomenon beyond noting that this is part of a much larger trend in contemporary society related to alienation and mass institutions.

3. Rejection of Alternative Models

A. COMPLETE ACADEMIC AUTONOMY

WHY IS A NON-ACADEMIC BOARD necessary? Why cannot those who know the university best, those whom the public regards as being the university, namely the scholars, have complete powers of self-government? These questions are openly asked by many members of faculties, and probably voice the silent opinions of many more. They look back wistfully to a golden age before Boards were invented. Boards in their present form date only from the nineteenth century. But the "golden age" for universities in Western civilization does not seem very golden to the historian. The heavy hand of Church or State, or both, lay upon the universities. Professors who gave offence could be suspended by the State—on the gallows, or fired by the Church—at the stake. When times became milder in Britain, a new instrument was forged (by Queen Elizabeth) for university government, namely royal statutes, detailed and practically immutable, under which Oxford and Cambridge and their separate colleges stagnated until the nineteenth century. Real reform in England had to wait until the foundation of the University of London (1836) and the numerous "civic" universities that followed its pattern. All of these from their foundation were governed by a two-tier structure, with the non-academic element predominating on the Board. A similar pattern was followed by the very numerous nineteenth-century foundations in Canada and the United States.

Nevertheless, Oxford and Cambridge, two of the most famous universities in the world, with apparently absolute powers of self-government by the academics, are naturally regarded with envy by the advocates of faculty self-government in Canada and elsewhere. The reason generally given for the impossibility of imitating them is the great wealth of their endowments. That is true of some of the colleges, though not all, but

much less true of the university (as distinct from the colleges), which depends on government grants, not quite to the extent of the other British universities, but still to such a degree that the university would be instantly crippled if the grants were not forthcoming. The British University Grants Committee is a friendly body, wisely sensitive to academic values and needs. It prefers to use the carrot of inducement rather than the stick of deterrence. But it does not control unlimited resources. It tells the university, "We will recommend a grant for your project A but not for your project B." So the Grants Committee, appointed by the Government, has in fact a hand, though a well-gloved hand, in determining academic policy at Oxford and Cambridge.

Still, they are more nearly self-governing than other universities. So the next question is: Do they govern themselves well? And the answer almost always given by those who know best is: "No." In the first place the complete independence of each college as a separate corporate body makes a united university policy almost impossible. Secondly, the structure of the university's own governing bodies is so complicated that few people understand it, and most of the academics leave it to the few experts (including, alas, the cranks and the obstructionists). Thirdly, any proposal that emerges from the complex can be opposed by any member of the faculty—or by any of a large number who have votes but are not members of the faculty. If so opposed the proposal has to be deferred, and to be the subject of a subsequent debate and vote. It is therefore not surprising that neither Oxford nor Cambridge has ever found it possible to initiate and carry through a major constitutional reform. Since the mid-nineteenth century it has four times been necessary for the Government to intervene and appoint a Royal Commission with power to reform the universities' constitutions.

This incapacity for self-reform is no accident. It is the inevitable outcome of a closed society or profession that has no need to take a wider view than its own interest. It was this spirit that damaged and ultimately destroyed the value of the mediaeval Guilds. Many people would say that both the legal and the medical professions today, though not absolutely autonomous, are showing dangerous tendencies towards preferring their professional to the public interest. One form that this "guild" spirit takes in the academic world is a reluctance to embrace new fields of study. These are accepted only if they are a development from studies already regarded as respectable. It took an absurdly long time before science was allowed equal status with the humanities. That battle was finally won. But to this day at Oxford and Cambridge the whole range

of social sciences, as a new field of study and therefore suspect, is underprivileged and neglected though it is now playing a vitally important role in most of the major universities elsewhere.

Imagine a completely self-governing university in Canada, shielded from public pressure and public opinion. The faculty needs more money, not necessarily to increase their salaries all round, but—shall we say—to tempt some highly qualified professors to work in the graduate school. An increase in students' fees is the easiest solution. Or the faculty decides that too many students are failing to reach the standards which the faculty itself demands for success in a degree course. Admission standards are therefore raised. Both these solutions may be against the public interest. But who is to define the public interest? Probably the public interest, as defined by a completely autonomous faculty, would differ significantly from that propounded by a governing body with outside membership.

We have elaborated the point in order to show why we reject not merely the Oxford and Cambridge model but also any model that involves complete powers of self-government by the faculty. In one form or another the public interest must be enabled to make itself heard and respected by all universities.

We received many briefs from Faculty Associations arguing that professors were just as capable administrators as business men and knew more about the particular business of running a university. That may be true, but the argument neglects the real point at issue which we have tried to define.

B. COMPLETE EXTERNAL CONTROL

SOME ACADEMICS WHOM WE MET mentioned with envy the system of university government practiced in many countries on the European continent. In this system, the Minister of Education has *de jure* control of the universities but by the force of long tradition delegates a great number of *de facto* powers to the professors of each institution who, in turn, elect Rectors for short terms to carry out their wishes. This, to academics, seems to minimize the heavy role of university administrators and lay boards of trustees. But a closer examination reveals that this system has serious drawbacks in its potential subordination of universities to the state.

Professor Cowley has pointed out how the highly reputed nineteenth-century German universities had weaknesses in their structure of government which led to most unhappy results:

> German professors controlled the curriculum, and once appointed had permanent tenure . . . but they had little voice in the assignment of funds and much less influence in the selection of their colleagues than many of them . . . believed. Thus the control of "academic matters" and even their boasted *Lehrfreiheit* were but icing on the cake of their thralldom, through the minister of education, to an authoritarian state.*

Most observers, we believe, would agree that unqualified state control of the budget and influence in university appointments constitute an excessive price to pay for tenure and *de facto* control of the curriculum. In Canada, there were no provinces where this degree of state intervention was even remotely in prospect; but in a later chapter we discuss the problems arising from the need of both private and provincial universities to rely upon their provincial governments for an ever-increasing proportion of their revenue.

C. SINGLE-TIER FUSED BOARD

THERE IS ANOTHER model, one which can be found in Canada, namely the Conseil d'Administration found in some Catholic universities in Quebec and New Brunswick. This body more or less combines the functions of Board and Senate, and for that reason includes academics, either elected or more often *ex officio* as Deans of Faculties. This seems to have worked well enough, especially in the smaller universities. But it seems to us to contain a risk that the academic issues will take second place to the more pressing fiscal and administrative problems. In other words, in trying to do the work of both Board and Senate, the Senate functions may receive too little attention, and still more important there may be too little communication between the Conseil in its academic role and the faculty at large. Whatever the reforms which may follow the Parent Commission Report in the universities currently using the model of a single Conseil, we would regard this model as undesirable for universities elsewhere in Canada. The subject of relations between Churches and universities is discussed further in chapter 11.

*W. H. Cowley, "Professors, Presidents, and Trustees" (unpublished manuscript), chapter VIII.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Throughout the remainder of our Report we shall indicate the kind of structure of university government which seems most appropriate to the conditions of Canada now and in the near future. The two-tier pattern is retained but our proposals involve an almost fundamental alteration. In place of the assumed separation of powers between Board and Senate, we propose a system whereby they are brought into much closer contact at many stages.

Some of our main conclusions have been so clearly and concisely formulated by the Parent Commission in Quebec that we have obtained permission to quote in full, as Appendix I to our report, two of their paragraphs dealing with faculty and student participation in university government.

The chapter on higher education in the Parent Report (vol. II, chapter VII) contains much wisdom and deserves to be studied by all those concerned with universities throughout Canada.

4. The Board of Governors

A. COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE

THERE CAN BE NO UNIVERSAL rules as to the composition of Boards. But there are some general principles which can be stated. First, as to size: if a Board is very large, frank discussion becomes difficult, members do not get to know each other well, and an inner ring tends to form, perhaps taking formal shape as an Executive Committee, which meets frequently and in fact makes all the decisions. When this happens, the meetings of the full Board become infrequent and the business formal. An Executive Committee may be necessary but the danger just mentioned can be prevented if there are monthly meetings of the full Board. Twenty, or twenty-five at most, is the right sort of number if all members are to feel that they have a real contribution to make. And if seats are to be found for the different interests that we shall suggest, the size of the Board should not be less than fifteen.

Secondly, there should be more variety than is commonly found at present among Board members. Business men and lawyers tend to predominate. Both are admirably suited for the fiscal and constitutional aspects of the Board's duties, but what we may describe as the "window on the world" ought to be wider open. Both these professions are naturally concerned to keep many aspects of their work strictly confidential and to avoid unnecessary communication, whereas the lack of good communication, from top to bottom and vice versa, seems to us a major cause of misunderstanding and discontent in many Canadian universities. And we do not refer solely to lack of official communication. We recognize that there are aspects, both fiscal and personal, of Board business that must be kept confidential. But it was almost tragic to hear senior members of faculty say that they had never met a member of their Board socially, and pathetic to hear Board members regret that they knew hardly any of the professors by sight. Of course these contacts

exist in some universities, perhaps in most, but not in all. And that is quite wrong. We hope it is not offensive to say that business men and professors, as types, have exceptionally different standards of value, each tending slightly to disapprove of the other. Both need help to cross the gulf. Such help could be given by adding to the Board members of other professions, scientists, writers, men of mark in any of the arts, or those who have retired from any branch of public service, not excluding former academics. It was a pleasure to meet Professor Penfield, O.M., on the Board of Governors of McGill, the university to which he had brought such high distinction. One need not look quite as high as the Order of Merit to find others in the same category who would serve their Boards well.

Thirdly, Boards should not be self-perpetuating, nor should members hold office for life. This will not happen in those provincial universities for which the Government appoints a majority of the Board. It can happen in a "private" university. Members serve too long, and the Board becomes too elderly. And when a vacancy does occur, the test of suitability looked for in selecting a new member is likely to be: "Will he fit in with our ways and our ideas?" Yet new ways and new ideas may be urgently necessary. These can best be achieved by giving to each of several professional or public bodies the right to nominate a member of the Board for a fixed period, say three to five years—such bodies as the legal profession, the medical profession, the chamber of commerce, organized labour, the local or provincial school-teachers' association (the last body is sometimes represented on a Senate, but the Board is a better place for external representatives). Some seats should be filled by co-opting (also for a fixed period), so that a Board can secure for itself a member who seems likely to be particularly useful (which does not mean "particularly wealthy"). Such a Board will not be as cosy as if it were self-perpetuating. But experience of other countries has shown again and again that common interest in the university soon welds the various members together, to the mutual advantage of the lions and the lambs. And the "window on the world" will let in more light.

Three bodies remain to be considered for Board membership—alumni, students, and faculty. We recommend in a later chapter that the common practice of electing a certain number of alumni to seats on the Board should be continued. Also in a later chapter we recommend that other universities should adopt the practice at Queen's University of including as a full member of the Board a Rector, not himself a student, but elected by the students.

It remains to consider the question of faculty representatives as members of the Board. For most Faculty Associations throughout Canada this is undoubtedly the burning question. It was a principal topic, sometimes the only topic, raised at our meetings with Faculty Associations nearly everywhere except in the few universities which do provide, in some form or another, for the voice of the faculty to be heard on the Board. Canadian university teachers are well aware that in Britain and all other Commonwealth countries the Senate elects a minority of members of the Board (or its equivalent, generally Council in England, Court in Scotland). Inevitably your Commissioner from Britain asks as his first question on this subject, "Why is it quite exceptional in Canada?"

The answer seems to rest upon two theories, the first one being that there is a total separation of function between Board and Senate—between fiscal and academic affairs. We have already argued that this theory never corresponded with the facts and is increasingly proving to be untenable. Also, even in its most rigid form, the theory allowed a one-man link in the person of the President. If one, why not more than one? And the President, as we shall point out, is the chief sufferer under the present system.

The second theory maintains that the Board is the employer and the faculty are its employees. This is presumably why in the acts or charters of many Canadian universities it is laid down that no member of faculty may become a member of the Board. If a university were in fact a business corporation, this might make sense. But it is not. A business corporation none of whose directors had ever taken an active part in the work of the corporation would command little confidence. And that is true of most university Boards. The normal employer-employee relationship and the normal tests of efficiency cannot apply in a university, where the profit-motive does not and ought not to exist and where productivity is simply not measurable, as between departments or individuals, or indeed at all. This is not an argument for abolishing, or in any way diminishing, the supreme responsibility of the Board. It *is* an argument for adding to the Board some members besides the President who know the institution from the inside.

For some Board members who could see the force of this argument there was still a fatal objection: "But they would be fixing their own salaries." This objection is met in British universities by the rule or custom that the faculty members of Council—full members in all other respects—are not eligible to serve as members of the Council's salaries

committee, or if there is no such committee they withdraw from the Council meeting when salaries are discussed. A Board is all too likely, under existing constitutions, to meet faculty members only when its Faculty Association requests consideration of salary scales or conditions of tenure. This is a necessary function of the Faculty Association. But it should not cause Board members to say, as we heard them say, that teachers seem only interested in their own salaries. If a Board that takes that attitude were asked to add one or two faculty members, nominated by the Faculty Association in default of a more appropriate body, the Board might well feel that they would be including members of the Opposition in the Government. It would not work. The case for faculty representation on the Board depends on other reforms, especially on the existence of a body such as the kind of Senate that we advocate, which could elect responsible representatives to the Board.

When Mr. Justice Freedman, Chancellor of the University of Manitoba, recently gave public support to the principle of faculty seats on Boards,* he had inquired from a number of British vice-chancellors and American university presidents how they viewed the proposal. The Americans, who lack experience of the system, were quite dubious. The British vice-chancellors, who were all working under the system, were unanimous in their approval. Your Commissioner from Britain, who has had experience as lecturer, professor, vice-chancellor, and member of Council (Board) at four different British universities, thinks that he ought at this point, to explain why he, like his fellow vice-chancellors, found the system invaluable and indispensable. It is almost equally valuable to the Council, the Vice-Chancellor, and the Senate.

1. It helps the non-academic Council members to understand the point of view of the academics. This is genuinely difficult for them. Academics are a peculiar race, maybe too fond of argument, maybe too anxious for mathematical certainty on questions that do not admit of a neat solution. Yet they and their students *are* the university. The better the Council knows them and their point of view, the better will its own decisions be. And the Council does in fact work as a united body, lay and academic together. Friendships form. To take one example, a professor will invite a lay Councillor who shows interest to come and see his department, whose affairs may have cropped up on the Council agenda; and the Councillor will enjoy the visit and the contact with staff and students that it involves.

2. It helps the Vice-Chancellor, who is not a one-man two-way link between Council and Senate as the Canadian President has to be, but can be supported by his colleagues, both in interpreting to the Council

*"University Government," *C.A.U.T. Bulletin*, vol. 13, no. 1 (October, 1964).

the items of policy that come up from the Senate and in interpreting to the Senate the decisions on questions that come down from the Council. With the best will in the world the Canadian President cannot do this so effectively by himself. He has no doubt been an academic, but he has become an administrator (so has a British Vice-Chancellor). And his Senate will receive unpleasant decisions or awkward questions from the Council more readily if their elected colleagues on Council are there to support him at the Senate. Likewise they can support him when Senate business runs into trouble at Council. One of them may well know the case for a particular proposal in more detail than the Vice-Chancellor. They are full members of Council and are not bound to support the Vice-Chancellor, though by convention rather than rule they do not reopen at Council a matter that Senate has decided by a majority after discussion. On other business it is quite healthy for the Vice-Chancellor sometimes to realize that he has not fully appreciated the views of his academic colleagues, or indeed that he may be wrong. In Canada, as noted earlier, the President may in some universities be accompanied by a Vice-President, or more than one, at Board meetings. But they too are regarded as administrators *ex officio* by the professors, and in any case they could hardly oppose their President.

3. It helps the Senate, partly as shown in the preceding paragraph; partly too because it is just as difficult, and just as important, for professors to understand the point of view of the lay Council members as *vice versa*. Where professors are elected to Council in rotation, the faculty comes to possess a number of members for whom the Council is no longer an unknown or supposedly hostile body. But, above all, the right to elect members of Council is a really enormous asset to the morale of the Senate and, if the Senate has itself a majority of elected academics, to the morale of the whole faculty. It gives them the certainty that they have a voice on the supreme governing body.

That is the situation in British universities. Of course it does not produce Utopia. Of course the Senate occasionally elects a professor who proves difficult on Council. Yet even he learns pretty quickly that there are two sides to questions, that money is not limitless and that some decisions must be taken quickly without endless consultation and delay. But without doubt this is a main reason why there is far less tension and unhappiness in British universities than is common, *not* universal, in those of Canada today.

Your Commissioner from the United States recognizes that heads of universities in his own country seem less than enthusiastic at the prospect of faculty membership on the Board. But since most of these

Presidents would concede that the practice has worked well in Britain, the crucial question is whether or not the Canadian academic scene is sufficiently like Britain's to permit successful adaptation of the tradition in Canada. We received the distinct impression that Canadian academics and university presidents were so receptive to the values and traditions of British universities that they could make such an adaptation relatively quickly. The Board members, on the other hand, seemed generally much more North American in their orientation and thus might need more time and guidance to find the proposal acceptable.

At the two or three Canadian universities on our itinerary which do elect faculty members to the Board we questioned the Boards and found that in every case they thought the Board was strengthened by the inclusion of faculty members. We recognize that there are some wise and devoted Presidents who fear this proposal, and we do not claim to be wiser. But experience, on a small scale in Canada and on a large scale elsewhere, simply does not justify their fears.

Accordingly we recommend that charters and acts should be modified where necessary to permit the inclusion of faculty members on Boards. It is important that they should be members of the Senate so that they will know in advance the business that is coming from Senate to the Board and will not be tempted to raise, as if they were fresh issues, matters on which the Senate has reached a decision. Staggered three-year terms are desirable to ensure continuity of experience; but re-election should normally be discouraged so that the Senate shall sooner or later contain a substantial proportion of members who have served a turn on the Board.

Beyond the minimum of three members to permit proper rotation in office, the number of faculty members on the Board should vary with the size of the Board, not exceeding 25 per cent. The faculty should definitely be in a minority, because otherwise there would be a danger that the professors, being more vocal by nature and training than most lay members of the Board, would tend to monopolize the discussions. This is not unknown in British universities where faculty members are sometimes numerous on the Board. (Incidentally, they tend to be more regular in their attendance at Board meetings than some of the lay members.)

The faculty members must regard themselves as full members of the Board and not as delegates from the Senate. They must realize that some Board matters are highly confidential, and if there is any doubt about a particular item of business the Board should give a ruling as to its confidentiality.

They should be elected by the elected members of Senate from among the whole membership of Senate (i.e. excluding Vice-Presidents or Deans from the electorate but leaving them eligible for seats on the Board). We would hope that a custom would grow by which professors elected to the Board should not all come from the same Faculty, and that the more vocal Faculties should not be over-represented. As full members of the Board the professors are, of course, as free as any other Board member to differ from the President. The thought of this happening seems to alarm some Presidents and some professors, but, in fact, it is useful for the Board, and indeed for the President, to realize that opinions may differ and may therefore be legitimately uttered. If British experience may be quoted again, it creates no alarm or despondency when, as occasionally happens, a faculty member on the Board takes an opposite view from the Vice-Chancellor.

2. *Other Means of Improving Board-Senate Relations*

In addition to this recommendation for faculty seats on the Board, we think that there should be other ways of bringing members of Board and Senate into closer collaboration. One of them would be to include a minority of Board members on the Senate—a possibility which we discuss in our chapter on the Senate.

Another is the formation of Joint Committees, both *ad hoc* and standing, comprising equal numbers of Board and Senate. Such committees are especially needed to deal with the many problems where academic policy and fiscal reality are up against each other. While we were writing this Report we were informed by the University of Toronto that it had been agreed to form there a body to be known as the President's Council. The accompanying memorandum said:

> [this] will play an important role in university administration. It has little power in itself, since it is advisory to the President. Actually it may very well be the means of shaping the whole range of University policy. In essence it is an attempt to bring together representatives from the Board of Governors, senior administration, and Faculty for discussion of problems in which financial and academic policy are closely interrelated.

The President's Council at Toronto will consist of nineteen members of whom three are appointed from the Board, by the Board, eleven will be *ex officio*, chiefly senior academic officers, and five will be elected by the full-time teaching staff. The procedure for electing the faculty members has been agreed as follows: the University is divided into five constituencies, roughly equivalent in the numbers of staff. Each constituency elects by secret ballot one representative to the President's

Council. The franchise is based upon membership in a Faculty or College Council and eligibility for election is confined to Professors and Associate Professors. Each nomination has to be signed by ten members of the staff who represent more than one division of their particular constituency.

This Council is only now coming into existence. It seems to us just the kind of body (in its membership and in its general mode of election) that we would strongly hope to see instituted in other universities.

3. *General Comments on Board Procedures*

We think it very important that meetings of the Board should be held at regular and fairly frequent intervals. We suggest that there should be monthly meetings during the academic year. We suggest also, both here and in our chapter on the Senate, that meetings of these two bodies should be held in regular relation to each other in point of date, so that a Board meeting follows at a fixed interval after each meeting of the Senate.

In a later section we recommend that the President should not be Chairman of the Board. This raises the possibility of a Board Chairman holding office for such a long period that in knowledge of the university and its personalities he could tend to overshadow the President and in effect could become a kind of super-President. While the Chairman's functions are very important they should be quite different from those of the President who is the executive head of the university. We accordingly recommend that the tenure of the Chairman of the Board should be for a limited term of years, perhaps five years, with the possibility of one further five-year term, but no more. The ideal Chairman would be a man still in active life but who was prepared to give a reasonable part of his leisure time to his duties on the Board.

B. BOARD FUNCTIONS

THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS of the Board should continue to be as at present, i.e. to exercise the ultimate fiscal responsibility and the ultimate *de jure* sovereignty.

The Board has an important function in relation to the forward planning of university policy, which in its earlier stages will be initiated by Senate but will inevitably involve Board decisions at a later stage. We need hardly repeat that this interlocking can best be achieved by joint

action between the two bodies from quite an early stage. (The Senate's role in this forward planning will be discussed in our chapter on the Senate.)

A major premise of our recommendations for revised structure and functions of both Board and Senate is that these bodies must understand each other better and work together more closely. We understand that in departing from the principle of assumed separation of powers we are opening the possibility of clashing jurisdictions. In our Senate chapter we shall recommend that the Senate be allowed to discuss, and indeed pass resolutions on, any topic relating to the welfare of the university, not excluding matters relating to finance. Such Senate actions, would, of course, always be subject to the overriding legal authority and to the primary fiscal responsibilities of the Board.

Conversely, we now recommend that the Board should not be inhibited from asking Senate to take a second look at some educational proposal that they have brought to the Board. The Board should give their reasons if they think that Senate has failed to take into account some public reaction to a particular educational plan. Again, they should feel free to ask Senate to consider a new development which the Board thinks deserving of consideration. But, just as the Board must have the last word on fiscal matters, so the Senate must not be overruled by the Board on a purely educational issue.

We know that the above recommendations run clean counter to the accepted theory and may seem to open a veritable Pandora's Box of possibilities wherein Board and Senate might repeatedly clash. But in our view the choice is not between creating or avoiding this interaction but rather between doing it well or poorly. Already Boards are taking actions relevant to educational policy, and already Senates are expressing views with fiscal consequences. The sensible course must be to recognize this fact and to make sure that the two bodies are brought into a relationship before either body adopts an immutable position.

New universities are springing up throughout Canada. It should go without saying that a Board will need to be formed as the first stage, before any members of faculty are appointed. At this stage of a new university it is inevitable that the Board will have to take many decisions which would be properly initiated in Senate if a fully manned faculty were there to undertake them. If an infant faculty were to be prematurely granted full Senate powers and if they used these powers to freeze the educational *status quo*, the public interest would obviously suffer. On the other hand, the Board must realize that as the faculty reaches full stature, the proper powers must be duly transferred to the Senate.

5. The Senate

A. COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE

THERE IS ONE ASPECT of the Senate which, more than any other, surprises visitors who are new to Canada. That is the rarity of a Senate that is wholly academic in its membership. In the United Kingdom, in most other parts of the British Commonwealth, and in most of the greater American universities, the Senate is a wholly academic body. In Canada, however, as noted earlier, there are numerous non-academic members on many Senates. Often the Senate has become so largely external in its composition, acting as a kind of public relations committee, that the normal functions of a Senate have either lapsed or been passed on, perforce, to bodies such as the General Faculty Council or its Executive Committee. We recognize the value of the public relations function for Senates in Canada and will recommend in a later chapter other means by which similar results may be obtained. But it is so crucial for the Senate to become the central education forum of the university that we venture to recommend the removal of all external members except in those cases where it has been considered desirable to have a small representation from the Board of Governors sitting on Senate. We consider this exception (along with one relating to students which we shall discuss in our chapter on students) to be a necessary departure from the general principle of a wholly academic Senate. It seems to us not inappropriate, if Senate members are to sit on the Board, that Board members be equally welcome on the Senate. The evidence that we heard suggested that the presence of a minority of Board members did not inhibit the free and frank discussion of possibly controversial issues by the academics themselves and in fact proved educative to the Board members who attended. In general academics on Senate seemed to welcome the presence of a minority from the Board.

The size of a Senate often determines its effectiveness. It should be a

deliberative body, not a mass meeting. That sets an upper limit of about fifty. If the Senate is larger than that number there is every likelihood that its Executive Committee will play a disproportionate role and will tend to make most of the real decisions. On the other hand, if the Senate is to feel uninhibited, the administrative group (Vice-Presidents and Deans) must not form the majority; and in a large university the administrative group, including members from affiliated colleges, may total up to twenty. So the lower limit, at least for a large university, is not far below fifty.

Besides the President and the administrative group, who should comprise the Senate? The present practice varies. At some universities all full professors and no other academics have seats. This limitation seems to us to have no advantages, except that of avoiding the need for elections, and many disadvantages. First, it sets up a "gerontocracy," a government by the elderly—too conservative, too reluctant to be troubled by new ideas, increasingly losing touch with the younger men and women who constitute an ever increasing proportion of the whole faculty. Secondly, such a Senate is sure to include some professors who may be bringing honour to the university by their original work but who are antipathetic to committees and discussions and probably do not attend meetings; worse still, it will include all the loquacious and all the eccentrics, who may be distinguished scholars but intolerable as Senators. Thirdly, automatic tenure of a seat on Senate until retiring-age is too long.

We therefore recommend that the majority of the Senate should be elected by the faculty from the faculty, for staggered three-year terms, with rotation considered as normal but re-election not ruled out.

For election to the Senate, who should be eligible? And who should have votes? And should all, or some, or none of the seats be earmarked for particular Faculties? And if seats are so earmarked, should they be equal in number for each Faculty or allocated in proportion to the size of each Faculty?

There is scope for variety in answer to all these questions, since universities differ both in size and in tradition. We offer suggestions rather than recommendations. For eligibility, we suggest either all professors and associate professors or alternatively all tenured staff. In general we favour the former. Faculty below the rank of associate professor already form such a high percentage of total faculty (and their percentage is likely to increase) that if they formed a "youth lobby" and voted accordingly, the "gerontocracy" would change to a government by juniors. This would inevitably give the impression that the Senate was not a

responsible body. Also there are not many junior faculty who could afford to give the necessary time (quite a considerable amount of time) to their Senate duties without jeopardizing their chances of establishing their academic career. On the other hand it is important that junior faculty should feel that their voice can be heard somewhere in the government. Nothing else gives them so good a chance of developing a sentiment of loyalty to their university. Accordingly we suggest that, say, three seats on Senate should be reserved for faculty below the rank of associate professor who have tenure. The electorate for these seats should exclude professors and associate professors. If, as we are about to suggest, elections to Senate are held separately for each Faculty, these three "junior" seats will need to be rotated among Faculties by some agreed method.

Apart from these three seats, the electorate for Senate should be either all members of faculty who have tenure, or (since the tenure rules differ quite widely among universities) all full and associate professors and all other members of faculty who have been members for three or four years. It is good for junior faculty to feel that they will soon have at least an elector's say in the university government, but two or three years are needed before they can size up either policies or personalities. Meanwhile it will help junior faculty to find their feet if the Minutes of Senate, and the reports of its more important committees (with the removal of necessary confidential items), are circulated throughout the whole faculty by the Registrar's office, and we would recommend that this should be done.

Incidentally, voting should always be by ballot. We heard rumours of lobbying, which would be difficult to substantiate, but ballot is a security. We have considered the further suggestion of compulsory voting but we do not recommend it.

Although we heard persuasive arguments about the desirability of electing members to the Senate from the faculty at large, we feel that in a large university such a constituency would be too big for the electorate to know what they are doing. Therefore, it seems desirable to have elections conducted by each Faculty with a quota of seats approximately conforming to the size of each Faculty, but in no case exceeding a ratio of 3:1. Though elected on a Faculty basis, the members must regard themselves as representatives of the whole university and not simply of their own Faculty. Where there are seats on Senate for faculty of affiliated colleges, we recommend that these too should be filled by election and we hope that such members will try to adopt a university-wide perspective.

A Senate formed by these means could still be ineffective if it lacked the mechanism to make it function properly. As with the Board, there should be meetings of Senate at fairly frequent and regular intervals throughout the academic year. We suggest monthly meetings and have already suggested that Senate meetings should be followed up by Board meetings at appropriate, regular intervals. Although the Executive Committee might be able to handle some or all of the following tasks, it is important not to overload it or to concentrate too much power within its hands. Therefore, one or more of the following standing committees might be established, each with a majority of elected academics.

1. *An Agenda Committee*, to see that the agenda is properly set up, that necessary papers are prepared ahead of time by the appropriate body, and are circulated ahead of time, and to make it possible for individual members of Senate to put matters on the agenda.

2. *A separate Curriculum Committee*, whose functions we shall describe later. It must see that the agenda is not cluttered up with masses of relatively trivial questions, syllabus changes and the like, coming up from Departments and Faculties; such a committee could be given wide powers to approve course changes if it saw no reason why they need go to Senate.

3. *A Nominating Committee*, to nominate the members of the standing and *ad hoc* committees that are needed to consider the problems which arise with increasing urgency and frequency in the present period of rapid expansion. The President or a deputy named by him would, of course, chair the Nominating Committee, but it is important that nominations should be made in the name of the Senate and not of the President, and that the committees themselves should report to the Senate. The members of such committees may well be exactly those whom the President would have chosen. But any of the committees will carry more weight with faculty if it is a Senate committee and not a President's committee.

An important part of the Nominating Committee's duty will be to spread the work, i.e. to ensure that the same men, however wise or willing, do not serve on too many committees. And they should be free to nominate faculty members from outside the Senate or the professoriate, since they are in a better position than the President to spot the younger men and women who have shown good judgment at the level of their own Department or Faculty.

To enable these committees and those which will be described in the following section to work effectively, it is essential for proper administra-

tive assistance and record-keeping services to be provided by the Registrar. This function of serving the committees of Senate should be laid down as one of the Registrar's fundamental duties. Incidentally, the existence of even a well-functioning Senate should not preclude the holding of at least one annual meeting of the entire faculty. It is good for purposes both of morale and of communication for the teaching staff to assemble together and hear a report from the President on the state of the institution.

B. SENATE FUNCTIONS

FOR THE ACADEMIC SENATE to become the central educational forum that it should be, substantial powers will have to be delegated to it both from above and from below. On the one hand, the President should use the Senate and its committees as a principal source of advice on academic policies. On the other, departments and Faculties must transmit to the Senate for review many of their decisions on internal affairs. It is important, however, to distinguish between the quantity and the quality of matters brought before the Senate; care must be taken not to drown it in trivialities or it will have inadequate time to meet its major responsibilities.

We recommend below a sweeping set of functions for the Academic Senate, realizing that specific institutions may not need or be able to comply with all of them. For the smaller institutions, less elaborate procedures may suffice (though care must be taken, as growth occurs, to adjust processes to size). Some larger institutions may endorse all of our recommendations but feel that they can be implemented only gradually as their faculty acquires increasing sophistication in the techniques of university government.

1. *Senate Powers*

To avoid all doubt about the Senate's powers, we recommend that they should include specifically the power to make recommendations to the Board on any matter of interest to the university. This power would not in any way diminish the Board's ultimate control. Furthermore, a Senate would be wise to exercise this power with restraint, for a Senate which tries to do everything will end up doing nothing very well. Most definitely, the Senate must concentrate on the "commanding heights" of educational policy and leave the day-to-day administration of the university to the President and his associates.

2. *Long-term Academic Planning*

An academic plan involves careful and detailed stocktaking of where an institution is, where it wishes to go over the next five to ten years and with what priorities. In addition to the obvious fact that it takes an enormous amount of time and work, the task of developing such a plan is often a delicate one for the faculty because it involves making difficult and sometimes invidious judgments about the comparative values of different offerings and research programmes, both existing and proposed. Disagreements will inevitably occur. But the point is that, given the scarcity of resources that besets all universities, these judgments will have to be made by someone at some time. Rather than having to accept purely administrative *ad hoc* decisions, it would be far better for the faculty to evolve a consensus which reflects its own values and long-range goals. The risks and the demands may be great, but the values are sufficient to justify the enterprise. In the first instance, the very process of creating the plan opens up two-way channels of communication within the university in a most healthy manner. Second, the resulting clarity of institutional purpose helps to integrate the disparate groups on campus around common aims. And finally, the existence of these basic guidelines makes it much easier for faculty, administration, and Board to co-operate in subsequent decisions which fall within the agreed priorities.

The plan should represent the combined and co-operative efforts of the Senate, the administration, and the Board. The Senate representatives should be selected (and carefully!) by the Senate itself rather than being appointed from above. The President, Vice-President, and/or the major Deans should participate. The Board should also appoint representatives. Thus a joint committee will be formed.* (The committee should be kept small—from eight to twelve members depending on the size of the university.) In the early stages the task will be largely academic in orientation, and highly educational for the participating Board members. In the later stages, questions of fiscal feasibility will become more central, and it will then be the turn of the faculty to gain new perspectives. The plan, as ultimately prepared, should have the approval of both the Senate and the Board.

Some Presidents are less than enthusiastic at the prospect of the Senate participating to this extent in academic planning. They claim that faculties, at least in educational matters, are so conservative that they would be doubtful initiators of forward planning. Admittedly, in our visits we came across several situations where academics had

*Committees formed on this pattern already exist at a few universities. They should be the rule and not the exception.

strenuously objected to new programmes, to the embarrassment of Presidents and Boards under pressure from provincial governments to respond to alleged public needs. In these instances, faculty members may have felt that such new projects would draw off financial resources already badly needed for existing programmes or that the projects would not meet university-level standards. Certainly universities are asked to do many things which they must tactfully but firmly refuse to do (more on this in the section on relations with provincial governments). But there were several instances where faculties had opposed proposals which were quite orthodox by university standards (e.g. a dental school or a Faculty of Education), and for which the provincial governments had promised enough additional support so that existing programmes would not be threatened.

Presidents and Board members are thus tempted to bypass the discord and delays seemingly inherent in faculty committee deliberations. But we believe they would be wise not to do so, for at least two reasons. First, an articulate President, given a willingness to communicate the relevant facts, should be able to persuade a reluctant faculty of the justification for a new programme in an academic plan. This is really the heart of the presidential function—the exercise of leadership. The university is supposed to be a community founded on reason; although the academic seems as fiercely attached to his vested interests as anyone else, it is not beyond hope that he will respond to a combination of sensitive guidance and thorough orientation.

Furthermore, even if the faculty persist in shortsightedness, we would still argue the desirability of their participation in academic planning, because professorial resentment at being excluded can make the "costs" of bypassing them very dear. It was no coincidence that at a university where the President promoted several new programmes by bypassing his faculty and presenting them with *faits accomplis*, the professors were exceptionally vocal in their criticism of presidential leadership. Wise presidents will stretch out their time-table, grit their teeth, and plunge into the business of persuading the teaching staff of the rightness of their proposals.

Finally, if the planning committee is to function well, it is vital that the university provide it with a variety of services. Released time for participating faculty members is sometimes an aid. The committee will also need detailed factual knowledge of the university and staff assistance to assemble and digest it. Ideally, larger universities would have Offices of Institutional Research whose job it would be to perform just such a function. (It has often been noted that universities study everything in the universe but themselves.) Lacking such an agency, person-

nel could be seconded to the committee as needed from the Board or the Vice-Presidents—Academic and/or Business, the Registrar and/or the Bursar.

3. *Approval of Short-term Educational Policy*

If the previous task has been well done it becomes relatively easy to make short-term decisions in the light of the basic guidelines laid down in the academic plan, and to handle such other matters as have been omitted by or unforeseen in the plan.

If there is no long-term academic plan, things become more complex, but all the arguments of the last section in favour of faculty participation in planning apply equally here. Normally this would mean that a standing committee of the Senate would be consulted *before* any significant decision pertaining to educational policy. There are two major sources of misunderstanding connected with this issue. First, some administrators have considered that it is enough merely to consult the Senate on matters of curriculum *after* a decision has already been taken by the Board to establish a new College or Faculty. This will not do. Second, some presidents have tended to define "educational policy" very narrowly and then strictly to exclude from Senate jurisdiction all administrative and fiscal matters. Decisions to split colleges or to create senior administrative positions were, for this reason, not brought to the Senate. We feel that the spirit, if not the letter, of the law should bring such issues to the Senate as a courtesy. A shrewd President will lean over backwards to see that this is done.

4. *Senate Review of Departmental and Faculty Affairs*

As we shall amplify later (chapter 7), one of the key university problems is how to maintain institutional unity against the centrifugal pull of the Departments and Faculties. Although absolute standardization of practices is not desirable, some rough equity should be sought in matters such as degree and grading standards, course proliferation, standards of appointment, promotion and tenure, leave policies and so forth.

Deans, with the help of Faculty Councils, can pursue this goal among the departments under their jurisdiction. But to achieve it among such larger units on campus as Faculties and Colleges it is necessary to turn to university-wide offices and agencies. While the President and the Academic Vice-President (if any) or Dean of the Faculties are the obvious officers to be charged with this responsibility, it is both intrinsically and tactically preferable to involve the Senate widely in these matters. The fields of knowledge have become so diverse and so com-

plex that no one or two men can make comparative judgments as well as a widely representative group of scholars. Furthermore, the President who learns to share the onus of making these critical judgments will find his life much easier.

Undoubtedly there will be some reluctance among faculties to pass judgments on each other's practices. We think this can be overcome by imaginative executive leadership, and if it is not, the President may then make the necessary decisions with a clear conscience.

(*a*) *On Curriculum Matters.* The major concern here is to let the Senate act as a "fire brigade" for the occasional serious issue which will arise without, in the process, bogging down departmental and faculty business and flooding the Senate agenda with trivial details which impede its more important work.

If the Curriculum Committee is to act as the guardian of university-wide interests, it should not, in our view, be split up into smaller groups based on Faculty or College jurisdictions. At universities which have graduate programmes large enough to pose burdens, it would be possible to cut the Committee in two horizontally for graduate and undergraduate studies, because each half would still retain the university-wide perspective. (We shall say more on the Senate's role in graduate studies below.)

(*b*) *On Tenure.* We found uneven recognition among Canadian universities and faculties of the fact that the tenure decision is probably the most important one taken in regard to personnel. Mistakes made in appointments and promotions can hurt an institution, but a wrong tenure decision may have more lasting ill effects. Faculty thinking on tenure seemed to us to centre, not unnaturally, more on safeguarding it after it had been granted than on creating standards for awarding it which would be neither too severe nor too permissive. But we consider it urgent, if faculty are to seek careful safeguards for tenure rights and be ready to do battle to defend them, that they should be equally concerned to see that sub-standard teachers are not granted this precious protection. The shortage of qualified faculty over the next decade will undoubtedly result in a pool of marginally prepared teachers, and these will require careful evaluation. While we are not prepared to specify a given time by which the tenure decision should be made, we do not see how this crucial judgment can be made with care in less than four years. Some institutions wait seven.

Review of departmental and Faculty tenure recommendations can be undertaken by a standing committee of the Senate (with non-Senate members co-opted to lighten the load on the Senate) or, if the burden becomes too heavy, by *ad hoc* committees created for this purpose by

the Senate. (The former procedure obviously promises a higher probability of maintaining rough institutional equity.) In either case, the committee should operate on a confidential basis and report to the President or Academic Vice-President rather than to the Senate. We would expect the committee's advice normally to be followed, but would not rule out the opportunity for the executive to make a contrary decision *after* a thorough discussion with the committee. If this happened often, however, committee resignations should follow.

In the matter of protection against unfair dismissal after tenure has been granted, we endorse with one exception those aspects of due process described in Part IV of the Soberman Report on *Tenure in Canadian Universities.** The one point in that report with which we do not agree is that which stipulates that the committee of tenured professors before whom the hearing is held should be chosen by the local Faculty Association. The President of the Faculty Association or his designee might sit *ex officio* on such a committee, or be authorized to observe the hearings or to furnish counsel for the accused; but we feel that the Senate as the official, all-inclusive faculty body should name the committee. We know of some universities which have standing Academic Privilege Committees to handle this kind of problem. Their operations are confidential and the ultimate legal decision rests with the Board.

(*c*) *On Promotions.* Many of the recommendations made above for tenure procedures apply equally well in this area. There should be a standing committee of the Senate (of full professors, some co-opted from non-members if necessary to spread the Senate's work) which would judge all departmental requests for promotion and give confidential evaluations to the President (or Academic Vice-President). The committee should be broadly representative of all the major fields of knowledge, but the members should in no sense be special pleaders for their particular interests. It is important that they take their tasks seriously and not merely pass on to the upper echelons the burden of making unpleasant decisions. One such committee that we know of turned back 45 per cent of the requests for promotion. While it is admittedly awkward for faculty members to pass judgment on their peers and colleagues, experience has shown that a negative decision will be accepted with better grace when it has been arrived at with faculty participation.

Once again we can envisage the rare occasion when the President might want to depart from committee advice. If he does, it should be only after thorough consultation with the committee.

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(*d*) *On Appointments.* It seems to us necessary to have university-wide review of departmental standards of initial appointment only at the associate and full professor levels, unless tenure were to be granted automatically with a lesser appointment. Some elements within a university may tend to insist on equity of appointment standards at all levels; but it is simply not practicable to attempt this for lower appointments in these hectic days of recruiting. Deans and department heads need flexibility and speed in their quest for qualified faculty, and if mistakes are made (as inevitably they will be), these should be rectified by the tenure review.

When senior positions are to be filled from outside, the task could fall to a special committee of the Senate or it could be handled by the Committee on Tenure, since the appointment of persons at this level is tantamount to giving them tenure. (In some institutions it is given automatically with these ranks.)

5. *The Senate and Graduate Studies and Research*

At smaller liberal arts institutions with little graduate work, review of graduate policies does not usually constitute a problem. Similarly, at larger, research-oriented universities where the graduate programme is well established the mode of governing it appeared to us to be fairly well accepted. But at several universities "in transition" we found varying degrees of unease over the relationship of graduate studies to the rest of the university offerings.

The standard practice at larger institutions was to have a representative Graduate Council which, with the Graduate Dean, would assume the task of ensuring rough equity of standards among the participating departments. But this safeguard, necessary as it is, is not a guarantee against disproportionate growth of graduate work at the expense of institutional equilibrium. It is unrealistic to expect the interested members of the Graduate Council to act as the tail to their own kite. The President is the obvious man to handle this problem; but once again we feel that his ability to do so would be strengthened by reliance on the advice of the Senate.

The Senate committee which undertakes this review should have at least a majority of persons not predominantly associated with graduate work: as far as possible, it is disinterested judgment which is wanted. It is conceivable that such a committee might reject new graduate programmes that the university, the province, and/or the nation badly need. But the Graduate Dean and some of his colleagues should sit on this committee, and if they and the President are unable to persuade

the other members (or the Senate, on appeal from a negative majority report), then the powers of leadership are in decline. Generally speaking, then, given the very high costs associated with graduate teaching and research, and the normal jealousies among faculty members over preferential treatment usually accorded to graduate programmes, it is much better to obtain Senate approval of these new programmes.

Either this committee or a separate Research Committee should review, at least annually, the research programme of every department and should indicate cases where a research programme seems to be out of line with the university's general research policy or is absorbing too large a share of the university's own research budget.

While we observed that most Canadian universities will need to establish and/or expand graduate programmes and research on a large scale to make up for decades of relative neglect, we would caution against this being done indiscriminately. There is a real necessity to co-ordinate the development of expensive and specialized graduate programmes and research on a provincial, if not a regional, basis. (More on this in chapter 10.)

6. *The Senate and the Library*

We were dismayed to find how often the control of the library and of library policies seemed to be regarded as merely an administrative matter. It is not; it is an essential part of the academic work of a university and as such should be closely co-ordinated with the development of educational policy, both short and long term. We recommend that library policy should evolve from the advice given by a strong committee of the Senate, representative of many disciplines and working in close liaison with the educational policy committees. If any Board members sit on the Senate they should participate on this committee, since the fiscal aspects of expensive library developments need to be integrated with policy decisions. If the Senate has no Board members, consideration might be given to inviting some members of the Board to serve on this committee. We also recommend that the Librarian should be *ex officio* a member of the Senate.

7. *The Senate and University Special Services*

There are several university services, primary among which are extension classes and summer sessions, that are sometimes run as business operations even though their functions are strongly academic. We recommend that a watch-dog committee of the Senate be created to propose basic policies for these operations and to police standards.

Having said that, we would enter a plea that Canadian Senates pay special attention to the needs of their provinces for effective extension programmes. In some provinces with under-educated, dispersed populations, we came across universities which seemed too insensitive to their obligations in this area. In the future we feel that these Senates must somehow grasp the nettle of reconciling high academic standards with responsiveness to provincial needs.

8. *The Senate and the University Budget*

It has been customary for budget formulation to proceed upward from the departments through the Faculties to the President. We would expect department heads in the first instance to consult at least with their senior colleagues in determining budgetary priorities. Then Deans should meet with their department heads to discuss Faculty budgets, not simply on a departmental scale but with a Faculty-wide perspective. Similarly, the President, in receiving the Faculty budgets from the Deans, should discuss with them collectively university-wide priorities.

It is possible that some animosity will accompany the dropping of secrecy concerning fiscal preferences shown to one department or Faculty as against another. But this is a lesser evil than the rumours and resentments which thrive in a state of budgetary ignorance. One institution even goes so far as to publish its detailed budget annually.

One way to lessen the jealousies stemming from preferential treatment is to have the Senate participate in the review of the university-wide budget. This is the logical concomitant of the Senate's pre-eminent role in the formulation of educational policy. But it is greatly complicated by the fact that review of the entire institutional budget is very complex and time-consuming, and includes consideration of some relatively confidential material (e.g. salary levels).

The existence of a long-range academic plan (or, as in Britain, of a system of quinquennial government grants) lessens some of the heavy work involved, but we were told at the University of Saskatchewan at Saskatoon, where such a committee has been functioning for three years, that it still takes something like five to six hours a week for two and a half months. The Committee there consists of the President, Vice-President—Administration, one Dean, and four or five faculty members, including one from the Economics Department. The staff of the Vice-President—Administration serve the Committee and furnish it with the fullest factual information. The Committee leans over backward not to make policy in the guise of budgetary decisions, referring issues which seem to go beyond its terms of reference to the appropriate

body for resolution. After interviews in depth and much analysis, it labels each item as "urgent," "needed," or "desired" and submits its recommendations to the President. Thus far he has transmitted each such report unchanged to the Board which has also accepted them in the same form.

This speaks very highly of the quality of faculty participation; but it also raises the problem of discontinuity when faculty members who have just begun to gain expertise on the committee reach the end of their term of service and, quite understandably in view of the heavy drain on their time, do not wish to accept renewed appointment. Staggered three-year terms go part way in solving this dilemma; but universities would be wise, before assigning this function to a Senate budget committee, to take careful stock of their faculties' willingness and ability to participate as fully and as effectively as the assignment requires. As we noted earlier, universities may want to move toward some of these practices only as their teaching staffs acquire more sophistication in the processes of university government.

C. GENERAL OBSERVATION

BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL nature of several of the functions which we have proposed turning over to Senate committees, we have advised that committees handling these matters should report directly to the President, rather than to the Senate for full debate on their findings. We would like to add that these committees should nevertheless make annual reports to the Senate on their general operations and make available the maximum information compatible with their successful functioning.

6. The President and his Administrative Group

A. THE PRESIDENT

WE CONSIDER THAT THE PRESIDENT has been the chief victim of the defects of structure that have revealed themselves as universities become larger and more complex. Our major recommendations throughout this report aim at better communication and better representation from top to bottom and vice versa. In particular, with more links between Board and Senate, and with an elected majority on Senate, which itself elects members to seats on the Board, the President will have allies on both bodies. They can support him in presenting the Senate's requests to the Board. They can support him in explaining the Board's decisions, necessarily sometimes unwelcome, to the Senate. A President who under existing conditions feels himself baited and badgered by his Faculty Association may find this expectation difficult to accept. Yet it is true. The Faculty Association by its very nature carries no official responsibility. But the very same men, as elected members of the Senate, have responsibility thrust upon them. They become better informed, and if the Board's decisions are reasonable, they will see the reasons.

In three important ways the President must help such a reformed structure to work smoothly. First, while he will still need the group of Vice-Presidents and Deans as his essential aids for administration, he must turn at least as much if not more to his elected Senate members for consultation on academic affairs. To speak candidly, but not unkindly, the administrative groups that we met at some universities were overworked men, somewhat set in their ways and too busy to have time for forward planning and new ideas.

Secondly, when *ad hoc* committees are needed for particular academic problems—and they will be increasingly needed as the problems multiply with expansion—the President must firmly resist the temptation to

appoint the committee members. The Committee should either appoint them or recommend their appointment to Senate. Very likely the same members will be chosen as if the President had chosen them himself, but he will have avoided the odium of appearing to distrust the faculty's judgment. No doubt from time to time difficult men or obstructionists will get on to a committee. But it is far better that such men should be opposed by the other members, and routed, than that the President should exclude them and so make enemies. Most members of a responsibly elected committee will be sane! And if the sane majority, adequately briefed, presents a report that goes counter to the President's own views, he should recognize that he may be wrong—or, if that is asking too much, that it is better for the morale of his university for him to accept the committee's views and not to overrule them as an autocrat. Of course there are times when the President must make emergency decisions himself, and report them subsequently to the Senate. If his normal procedure is democratic, as outlined above, his faculty will not resent these exceptions. Likewise, it may help a committee to deal with obstructionists if the President gives it a time-limit within which to report, explaining why a decision is urgent.*

Thirdly, the President must take a personal responsibility for seeing that communications flow smoothly, rapidly, and accurately throughout his university. Such a flow is not only valuable in itself, but prevents the distorted rumours which so easily circulate in the absence of genuine information. Indeed, it seemed to us that within many universities information travelled at a speed inversely proportional to its accuracy.

Three questions were put to us in various universities.

1. Who should appoint the President? We recommend without hesitation that he should be appointed by the Board in consultation with the Senate. We do not think the Provincial Government should make the appointment. It will be well represented on the Board of provincial universities, and that should suffice. It is a severe handicap to an incoming President if his appointment has been made by a body outside the university. At the other extreme we heard the suggestion that there should be an open election from a list of any names put up by faculty members. This is quite out of the question. Most names would be too little known to most of the electorate for them to make a rational choice.

*"If one consults a sufficiently large number of people for a long enough time, one can develop insurmountable opposition to the most innocuous idea." Quoted by H. W. Dodds, *The Academic President—Educator or Caretaker?* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), p. 108.

Parties would form and lobbying would be inevitable. Ideally the Board should form a committee and should ask the Senate to appoint an equal number of members. The committee should then keep its proceedings confidential until it produces a single name, together with the consent of the candidate to accept appointment if it is offered.

2. What should be his tenure? We were asked in some places to consider the rotation of the office, biennially or even annually, between senior academics on the campus, as at Oxford and Cambridge and in some European countries. However, the resulting lack of continuous leadership is proving an embarrassment under modern conditions and tends to throw too much power into the hands of the permanent administrative officials. It also rules out the possibility of an appointment from outside and a new look at the whole university and its working, which is sometimes highly necessary. We reject the idea without hesitation. Elsewhere we met the suggestion that the President should be appointed for a term of, say, five years, with the possibility of renewal for not more than one five-year period. Something like this happens in the Roman Catholic universities, but there the Recteur, who has always up to now been a priest, has another opening found for him by the church. It would not be so easy for a lay ex-President to place himself suitably. There are, certainly, possible drawbacks to a very long tenure by a President (though your senior commissioner should confess that he held presidential office at his university for twenty-three years). Some faculties seem to fear that permanent tenure for a President may mean that in a situation where mutual confidence between President and faculty has broken down there will be no way out of the difficulty. But with the reformed structure that we propose, involving much closer contacts between Board and Senate, the Board could not fail to realize the destructive impasse and would be bound to take action accordingly. It would undoubtedly be difficult for a university to attract a really good man to a five-year, or possibly ten-year, post. On balance we consider the present practice is best, namely a permanent appointment subject to the pleasure of the Board and to a fixed retiring age.

3. Should he preside over the Board? Or the Senate? Or both? Or neither? In the normal pattern of Board and Senate, we are convinced that he should preside over the Senate and should not preside over the Board. On the Board he should be the chief spokesman of the academics to the laymen. He has often to be an advocate and should not occupy the chair. If he does so, it is almost inevitable that he will treat the Board as his real power-chamber, and will play down the role of the Senate.

We were surprised to come across the idea that he should not preside over the Senate, lest the members feel inhibited by his doing so. We realize that at some universities professors fear that outspokenness may jeopardize their own prospects. But under our proposed reforms the professorial future of a faculty member could not be subject solely to arbitrary judgments by the President or his Deans. If professors are too timid to say what they think, they should not be on the Senate. We regard it as virtually the most important task of the President to preside over the Senate. Faculties should realize that if a President does not preside over the Senate, he will feel less obligation to be the Senate's effective spokesman to the Board. From the chair of the Senate better than anywhere else, he can focus the discussion of academic policies, can guide them in the light of his full knowledge of any external factors involved, and can exercise the right kind of leadership, which is leadership by persuasion.

B. THE PRESIDENT'S ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP

WE FOUND MUCH FACULTY TALK of "The Administration" as though it were one vast monolith. Our experiences, by way of contrast, were of a variety of persons, with diverse attitudes on many issues, and in particular, by no means of one mind on the topic of university government.

Nevertheless, recognizing that "justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done," we urge that the image of a huge, impersonal administrative machine be altered. This can be done partly by the mode of appointment and partly by the modes of governing after appointment.

Some faculty groups at small universities in the course of rapid expansion expressed their opposition to the establishment of the office of one or more Vice-Presidents. The decreasing contact between faculty and their President which occurs at larger universities is, of course, to be regretted; but denying a President adequate administrative help is not the solution. It will only succeed in further overworking the President without increasing his ability to maintain contact with the teaching staff. Enlarged administrative staff is an inevitable consequence of the growth in size and complexity of universities, and faculties would do better to focus their concern on the factors which *can* be controlled, namely those just mentioned—the mode of appointing administrative officers and the ways in which they operate after appointment.

In our next chapter, we suggest in some detail ways to involve faculty

in the appointment of Deans and Department Chairmen. Here we also recommend that the Senate be consulted officially on the appointment of all major university-wide administrative positions, particularly that of the Academic Vice-President or Senior Dean. It is important that faculty should not get the impression that the Vice-President(s), the Registrar, and the Bursar are powerful figures, controlling large parts of the academic realm from the privileged sanctuary of the "world of business." On the other hand, we must note that several permanent officers complained of the automatic and a priori condescension which some faculties display toward anyone in administration. Obviously, mutual understanding and respect are to be desired and a wise President would urge his permanent officers to seek broad contacts with the faculty (e.g. use of common dining facilities), and a wise Faculty Association would, as we later suggest, open its membership to the administrative staff.

In terms of the proper functions of the President's administrative group, we wish to make a paradoxical observation. We found that at some universities the administrative group was used too much for policy guidance and too little for administrative co-ordination. We recommend that as universities grow larger, it will be necessary to give the administrative group formal standing and to have it meet regularly for the co-ordination and execution of policies decided by the Board and the Senate. The Vice-Presidents and Deans, Registrar and Bursar must be kept systematically and accurately informed of what is going on throughout the university in order to be masters of their respective tasks.

But this group, as we have noted earlier, should *not* be used by the President as his principal source of academic advice. It would not be good for the President if his Deans were too prone to agree with him; it would certainly be bad for the faculty if they saw the Senate being by-passed. The Deans and Vice-Presidents will have every opportunity to influence educational policy through their *ex officio* membership of the Senate. Nothing will weaken the effectiveness of the Senate more quickly or seal the image of a President's "party" more firmly than an administrative caucus which produces an automatic and unreal unanimity of *ex officio* opinion. The Senate needs the ideas and experience of the senior administrators but it must have them straight in all their variety and not filtered into a dull monochrome.

7. Deans and Department Chairmen

ALTHOUGH THE MORE IMPORTANT university decisions are usually taken on the upper levels of the Board, Senate, and Presidency, most of the day-to-day operating decisions are taken at the Faculty and department levels and it is here that many of the teaching staff derive their impressions of institutional benevolence or tyranny.

On our travels across Canada we found the tyrannical image much too prevalent. It could have resulted from faculty members holding unrealistic expectations of what it is possible for Deans and Department Chairmen to achieve. Or it could have been created by putting the wrong men in these positions and giving them the wrong powers. Whether the grievances were imagined or real, however, the fact remains that antagonisms engendered in these areas vitally affect the universities and must be dealt with.

The central problem is not difficult to describe, but is nearly impossible to solve on any permanent basis. There is an inevitable and continuing conflict between the President's interest in creating and maintaining the unity of the institution and the faculty's interest in obtaining the maximum possible decentralization. The President would naturally hope to surround himself with Deans and Department Heads who would make his task easier; the teachers would just as naturally favour Deans and Department Chairmen who would fight hard to enhance the power and resources of their jurisdictions.

The particular balance between these contending interests which is "right" will vary, not only from university to university or department to department, but perhaps through time. For instance, a department may sink into mediocrity or another become consumed with ambitions possibly threatening another department's legitimate interests—both of these cases would require more administrative intervention than would otherwise be desirable or proper. There is no general formula, then, which would apply to all situations for all times.

This indeterminacy makes it all the more important to choose the right men to make these decisions. Deans and Department Heads are caught up in the tug of war between the President and the faculty, and their mode of selection, their tenure and their powers should all reflect their relationship with both contending parties. If the President represents essentially the university-wide perspective, the Department Chairmen should normally push vigorously for the goals of their departmental colleagues, and the Deans should adopt a Janus-like posture, sharing the concerns of both and usually never quite agreeing totally with either.

A. DEPARTMENT CHAIRMEN

1. *Selection*

The departmental perspective should be the predominant, but not the exclusive, one in the choice of a new Chairman; for, with certain exceptions to be noted below, he should act as the spokesman for his colleagues and have their confidence. Some Faculty Associations, to attain this goal, have proposed outright election of Chairmen, but we feel that a mixed process, of nomination and selection, is more likely to produce the desired results.

There are at least two reasons why some administrative participation in the choice is appropriate. First, the person chosen will act not only as Department Chairman but also as a member of the administration and as such must be able to work well with other administrators. Second, and more importantly, there may come a time when some particular department badly needs upgrading in its standards and personnel, and the present staff is either unable to see the need or unwilling to make the change. In such a case, the Dean, Academic Vice-President, and/or the President (hereafter called Dean for brevity) should be able to reject the department's nomination of one of their own—or of some outsider whom he considers to be inadequate—and to ask for reconsideration. In all cases, he should supply his reasons (however delicate) for the action he takes and conduct thorough discussions with the department (or its elected advisory committee). Such a discussion, we hope, would lead to a mutually agreeable decision. But if not, the Dean must be allowed the last element of discretion. We would expect that the occasions for rejection of departmental advice would arise only rarely and for very substantial reasons. The Dean should realize that

his power to overrule can be exercised only at the cost of considerable antagonism in the department in question and that the new Department Chairman may meet considerable hostility. Nevertheless, if a Dean, carefully chosen in accordance with our recommendations below, feels that such risks are the necessary price of progress, he should possess the authority to make such a decision.

Some universities have attempted to lessen the possible parochialism of weak departments by providing for heavy outside membership on the advisory committees, this membership consisting of other Deans, Department Chairmen, or senior professors. One university has even reduced to one member the representation of the department whose chairmanship is being filled, but it is healthier in our eyes for the department members to have a larger role in the choice of their Chairman.

2. *Tenure*

By the same token, although we recognize certain instances (to be described below) when prolonged or indefinite tenure may be necessary, we feel that normally the term of office should be limited to, say, three or four years, subject to reappointment after renewed consultation. Some Faculty Associations urged that tenure be limited to one term, and others proposed only one possible reappointment. But we consider it unwise to regulate this matter rigidly as long as the processes of consultation are required for reappointment. We recognize that faculty members have especially strong feelings that their Chairmen should remain "one of them" and that, for this purpose, rotation in office is desirable. With relatively short terms, adequate administrative assistance, and, where large departments justify it, appointment of Associate Chairmen to share the burdens, there is no reason why Department Chairmen should lose their academic outlook, become corrupted by the evils of hierarchy or find return to full-time teaching and research very painful.

Nevertheless, there will obviously be occasions when reappointment, longer terms, or even indefinite tenure may be needed. Such procedures may be required when starting a new department, when seeking an important name from outside to head an existing department, when there is only one senior professor in a small department, or when an attempt must be made to upgrade standards against the wishes of the bulk of the department. While each of these reasons seems like a good one, we would caution again that this kind of practice often brings on more trouble than it is worth. This is another matter in which a carefully chosen Dean (or Academic Vice-President or President, as the

case may be) should ultimately have the power to decide, but only *after* the fullest consultation with the department in question.

3. *Powers*

Although by American standards most Canadian universities are not large, they are already big enough to create feelings among some faculty members that they are part of a complex, impersonal machine. And, of course, with continued growth most universities will find this problem increasing.

It is all the more important, then, that there be a place on campus where the teacher can participate in a direct meaningful way in some of the decisions which affect his professional life. He may have to elect people to represent him on the Academic Senate and in larger universities perhaps even on the Council of his Faculty, but within his own department, communication, consultation, and participation should be maximized. The relevance of this to the Chairman's powers is obvious and will be expounded below.

We found considerable variation in departmental techniques for self-government. One set of variables centred around the question of the relative powers of the senior and junior staff. Participation in decision-making in some departments was restricted to the Chairman, in others extended to all senior professors, and in others, occasionally, it embraced the whole department. Alternatively, at some universities decisions regarding appointment, promotion, and tenure were confined to the senior staff, and other matters (e.g. undergraduate and graduate curricula) were handled by the whole department.

We recognize that in departments where inexperienced, non-tenured persons are present in sizeable numbers the senior professors and the Chairman may have to play a larger role. But the department is the natural place for junior staff to begin to participate in university government and their opportunity to do so should be curtailed for only the most cogent reasons. And even if their participation in decision-making must be restricted, we would hope that communication of relevant information to them would be thorough and informal consultation with them widespread.

Another procedural issue concerning departmental operations is whether or not standing committees are to be used, and if so, whether they should be elected or appointed. The use of standing committees in a department large enough to justify them is a good device for procuring the continuity of leadership needed when rotation of the

Chairman is practised, but their use should not preclude periodic meetings of the whole department. We have already commented on the desirability of electing faculty committees where possible, instead of appointing them. The difference in Committee personnel may not be great, but helping the faculty to avoid feeling manipulated by administrators is important.

Whatever the internal arrangements that may be established for faculty participation in departmental government, it is clear that we are recommending for the Chairman normally a role of "first among equals." He always will and should have certain areas of administrative discretion, but the department's basic policies should be approved collectively.

In cases where, to raise the standards of a weak department, the Chairman has been appointed without the members' approval, the executive powers will probably have to be more extensive. But even then we would hope to see maximum reliance on explanation and persuasion, and minimum use of naked power. We have seen and heard enough of the sensitivities of academics to realize how smouldering resentments and bitterness can create a nearly intolerable atmosphere in a department, a faculty, or even a university. So, ambitious new Chairmen should realize the distinction between what they can and what they should do, or they may find themselves winning a battle or two but losing the war.

B. DEANS

1. *Selection*

We have noted earlier that the Deans stand between the President with his emphasis on institutional unity and the Department Chairmen with their proper concern for decentralization. Deans should be selected, then, by the President after advice from an advisory committee on which both decentralizers and unifiers sit in about equal numbers. For the President a Dean is a key administrative officer, serving as a two-way channel of communication between his Faculty and the rest of the university and supervising the implementation within his Faculty of university-wide policies decided by the Board and/or Senate. If Faculties were to elect their Deans, as some propose, the result might or might not be acceptable to the President; and one can understand his need to ensure that the choice will give him a man with whom he can work.

On the other hand, a Dean's duties in working with the departments under his supervision in matters pertaining to budgets, appointments, promotion, tenure, sabbatical leave, etc., involve him intimately in departmental and staff affairs and make it imperative that there be confidence in his "academic values." While consultation with interested faculty in the choice of a new Dean does not guarantee this result, it does make it more likely. We found that often where Deans had been chosen without adequate consultation of faculty opinion, they were regarded as "tools of the administration" with a concomitant rise in tension levels.

(We are not seeking a formula for a University of Utopia where all is sweetness and light, and tensions are a thing of the past. We recognize the inevitable disagreements which will occur between those making and those receiving negative decisions and between those making and those *not* receiving preferential decisions. We insist merely that such tensions can grow far beyond the necessary levels and become pathological and that sensible steps should be taken to hold such hostilities down to a tolerable level.)

The exact mode of consultation will vary a great deal. Some academics proposed that names of candidates for a deanship be circulated to all members of the Faculty in question for a vote of instruction. We feel that this matter requires both more delicacy and more opportunity for give-and-take than such a process would permit. Particularly if names from outside the campus are to be considered, confidential *discussions* on the candidates' relative merits and the Faculty's special needs should take place between the President (or Academic Vice-President) and a representative group of the Faculty. The latter body could be either an advisory committee elected by the Faculty Council (not appointed from above), or, if the Council desired, the Department Chairmen within the Faculty.

The university-wide or centralizing interests should probably be represented by the President and/or the Academic Vice-President and several other Deans. Sometimes a member of the Board of Governors might also sit on the advisory committee. And for deanships of professional schools, some universities ask specialists from outside the university to aid in the search.

In the unlikely event of disagreement between the President and this broadly based committee after full and candid discussion, we would recommend leaving the final discretion with the President, always bearing in mind that he will himself have been chosen after careful consul-

tation and always hoping that he will appreciate the "costs" of rejecting academic advice.

2. *Tenure*

The question of term of office for Deans is much more complex than that for Department Chairmen. In the latter case the three-year part-time tenure which we recommend as normal for larger departments does not put the Chairman's professional competence in serious jeopardy or bar his return to full-time teaching and research.

In the case of Deans, however, in most of the larger Faculties (and we are anticipating here continued growth of most universities over the next ten years) it will become progressively harder to keep up with one's field while handling the increasing burdens of administration. In a sellers' market the recruitment of faculty for the many new positions to be filled will demand much more time; and it will be necessary to screen tenure and promotion decisions more carefully to guard against weakened standards in the rush to acquire sufficient staff. All this on top of normal duties in budgeting and planning the expanding facilities means that most Deans (1) will be too busy to maintain their academic standing, and (2) will acquire through time administrative skills and experience that the President will hate to see sacrificed on the altar of rotation in office. (Incidentally, Deans of several large Faculties—including some former Faculty Association leaders turned administrators—agreed that fairly long terms were necessary to acquire sufficient experience to enact successful reforms.) Clearly, there is a conflict between the claims of administration and those of teaching and research.

There is another factor which may have some relevance to the issue of Deans' tenure. There will be a shortage not merely of qualified faculty in Canada (and elsewhere) but also of skilled and experienced administrators. This means that the better Deans, instead of returning to faculty ranks at the end of their terms of office, may well become Deans, Vice-Presidents, or Presidents at other institutions. The poorer ones presumably would remain and rejoin the teaching faculty. Giving the superior Deans longer terms, or option to renew on short terms, does not, of course, guarantee their permanent allegiance to an institution, but it does lessen the temptation to leave.

Is there any answer, then, to the dilemma that the Dean should ideally be, and should be *thought* to be, an "academic man" with "academic values," yet be able to master intricate administrative problems,

work harmoniously with the President and other senior administrators, and, when the time comes, be willing to step back into the ranks? There may not be one single answer, but there are a series of actions which, if taken, could go a long way in helping to resolve the dilemma.

First, use the consultative procedure already suggested to help choose the best possible candidate.

Second, establish a term somewhat longer than that of Department Chairman, possibly four or five years, and allow (but discourage) the possibility of reappointment *after* renewed consultation.

Third, provide adequate administrative assistance, even in small Faculties, so that a Dean can avoid being deluged with trivialities and will have more time to consider policy questions and maintain his professional interests.

Fourth, in Faculties that are large enough to justify it, establish Associate and/or Assistant Deans to bring promising younger staff in on shorter terms to help relieve the Dean's load and to allow their administrative potential to be assessed for future times.

Fifth, provide sabbatical leaves for retiring Deans who will be returning to teaching long enough to merit them. Such leaves will not only allow them to catch up with the latest developments in their field but also, incidentally, remove them from the temptation to breathe down the necks of their successors during the first year of the new regime.

Finally, if the university is really serious about the value of rotation in office (and we witnessed enough Dean-centred tensions to urge that it be taken seriously), it should be prepared to follow the example of one institution which now provides that its Deans returning to teaching and research shall suffer no drop in pay. Their salaries remain at the same level until such time as the professorial scale rises to equal them. This provision would also answer some of the concern about loss of pension benefits which Deans returning to teaching would incur.

As with Department Chairmen, we note that a particular institution may have a special need to appoint a Dean to indefinite tenure when starting a new Faculty or when trying to attract a person of major reputation from outside. We would not absolutely rule out such an appointment, but it should be made only after thorough explanation and discussion with the advisory committee and in full recognition that severe internal problems may result.

3. *Powers*

The Dean's role in helping to form university policy and in co-ordinating its implementation with other administrators has been discussed

in the preceding chapter. Here our concern is to examine his relationship with the departments and staff under his supervision.

With the exception of those cases just noted, when a new Faculty is being started or when an outsider has been brought in under special conditions, we would expect the Dean to form Faculty policies only after advice from his teaching staff. In small Faculties it may be possible to do this through meetings of the full faculty. But when meetings start expanding to more than fifty persons, it would be wise to establish a smaller body to act as the source of advice to the Dean. This body could either be elected or, if Department Chairmen really had the confidence of their colleagues, could consist of all such Chairmen. In any case, the existence of a representative body should not preclude the holding of occasional meetings of the full Faculty for the vital purposes of communication and discussion. Effective policy advice, though, would normally come from the smaller agency and it should not have to wait for full Faculty endorsement before acting.

A careful distinction should be made between the Dean's receiving advice on broad questions of Faculty policy, including difficult areas like budget priorities, curriculum planning, and even appointment, promotion, and tenure policies, and his being circumscribed in his necessary administrative discretion. As we have noted in the chapter on Senate, the teaching staff cannot and should not hope to supervise the university administration in its day-to-day activities, nor even to grind out policy statements on every conceivable issue to arise within university precincts. Rather, at Faculty level as at Senate, the most effective academic advice will be that which has been carefully prepared and which focusses on the central academic issues. No good Dean could object to receiving advice of this kind and he will be much stronger for it.

C. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

WE CAN UNDERSTAND THE LACK of enthusiasm of some Presidents for the principle of rotation of Deans and Department Chairmen. Not only does this system remove these officers just as many of them have made themselves very valuable to the central administration; but it also increases the heavy burden of administrative participation in the selection of successors with a consequent heavy toll in lost good will when one candidate is chosen and three others passed over.

Nevertheless, we would argue that even if the costs seem high, the

rotation principle is desirable and that the costs can be significantly lessened through appropriate leadership. Nothing can totally compensate for the loss of an outstanding Dean through rotation, but if he has been governing his Faculty along the lines that we have recommended in this chapter, there should be a body of experienced professors, including several who may have served briefly as Associate or Assistant Dean, who will have shared widely in the formation of Faculty policies. Admittedly, if an outside man is brought in, the transition may be more abrupt, but once again, if he is the right kind of Dean, he will look to these same experienced professors for his guidance in policy-making. The same kind of reasoning applies to rotation of Department Chairmen as well. As for the resentment of candidates passed over for a chairmanship or deanship, it need not be focussed on the President if he has developed the good habit of normally accepting the recommendation of the advisory committees.

On the other hand, the principle of rotation holds certain advantages for a President. It allows a new President the opportunity to inject his own influence (albeit gradually) into the selection of new Deans and Chairmen as these positions fall vacant. It also affords him a more tactful way to remedy a mistake when he has inherited or appointed a sub-standard Chairman or Dean. One university even goes as far as to provide for a clean sweep of all administrative offices two months after a new President comes in. This seems to us less desirable than gradual rotation, for the new President cannot possibly give careful consideration to all these appointments in two short months and will nearly always have to reappoint the incumbents, thereby lessening the opportunity for a change when he will have had time to consider it.

A final argument—one less tangible but seeming to us to be singularly relevant to the world today—has to do with the question of centralization and bureaucratization of twentieth-century life, in universities as elsewhere. It may seem ironic to urge a President to help to promote the forces of decentralisation by agreeing to appoint Deans and Department Chairmen acceptable to their teaching staff and agreeing to change them often enough to prevent them from acquiring a deep-grained administrative mentality. But it is exactly this kind of action which is likely to channel the restless spirits into constructive modes of action; and even if, occasionally, it results in extra headaches for the President, it would be a poor President who would prefer presiding over passive mediocrity to the greater challenge of keeping a firm rein on ambitious departments and Faculties.

D. A CAUTION

HERE, AS IN THE CHAPTER on the Presidency, we have recommended that permanent administrative staff be employed to help busy officers perform their tasks. But if this recommendation is to be combined with the principle of rotation of Deans and Department Chairmen, care will have to be taken to ensure that the permanent staff do not, through time, come to play a dominant role by virtue of their expertise. We have no answers to this problem other than to urge vigilance on the part of incoming academic officers and perhaps making it explicit to the administrative staff that they should consider themselves policy-executors and not policy-makers.

8. External Participation in University Government

IN EARLIER CHAPTERS we have recommended reducing the size of the Boards of Governors and removing the non-university members of the Academic Senate. This would seem to contradict our major premise that universities need windows to the outside world which will make them sensitive to important public needs and which will involve a wide variety of persons from the outer community in university affairs.

Part of this heightened sensitivity would come, of course, from the more heterogeneous membership which we urge for the smaller Boards of Governors. It is their representativeness rather than their absolute size which is the crucial variable here. The increasing contacts between universities and provincial governments with their university advisory bodies will also sharpen awareness of the public interest; the danger here is that the influence may be too strong. (This subject is treated further in chapter 10 below.)

But there are additional and, we feel, desirable ways in which universities may profit from outside talents. We recommend the adoption of any or all of the following three suggestions.

1. *Creation of a University Court*

This body would be very large—anywhere from one hundred to three hundred people, with members drawn from among the following sources:

(*a*) Board of Governors,
(*b*) President and his administrative group,
(*c*) Academic Senate,
(*d*) University Alumni,
(*e*) Benefactors of the University,
(*f*) Provincial legislature,

(*g*) Local authorities,
(*h*) Local school administrators,
(*i*) Teachers' organizations,
(*j*) Local Chambers of Commerce,
(*k*) Local labour organizations,
(*l*) Churches of the main denominations,
(*m*) National learned societies,
(*n*) National professional institutes.

This group of persons interested in the welfare of the University should meet once or twice a year to hear reports from the President (and possibly Board and Senate members) on the state of the institution, to discuss matters of general interest, and, where appropriate, to pass resolutions on any university topic to be sent to the Board and/or Senate for consideration.

This Court would be unlike existing British university courts because it would have no *de jure* powers. (In this respect it would resemble more the existing University of Alberta Senate.) In our view, it might even replace Convocation, the assembly of teachers, administration, and all graduates of the university, where this institution now exists, because there is little need for two bodies of such similar function and there can be a large contingent of alumni on the more broadly representative Court.

2. *Outside Membership on Board and Senate Committees*

Although we have recommended keeping both Board and Senate relatively small in the interests of their effective deliberation, qualified persons not belonging to either body might with advantage be co-opted on standing or *ad hoc* committees in cases where their competence would be helpful. One obvious instance in which this could work well would be a Board's Committee on University Development which would add a large number of persons from the community to broaden its base of appeal for funds. The Board and the Senate should each create by-laws to regulate the manner in which outside persons may be added to their committees.

3. *Outside Membership on Advisory Councils of Professional Schools*

We were also told of the practice of putting outside experts on advisory councils for bodies like dental, medical, agricultural, forestry, education, law, and engineering schools. This seems eminently logical and is a matter the details of which should be determined by careful

deliberations within the governing body of the school in question. We think this practice can be followed without the danger of professional Faculties forming alliances with off-campus pressure groups to improve their relative position within university budgetary priorities. We speak more of this danger in the next chapter.

9. Other Forces Inside and Outside the Universities

A. FACULTY ASSOCIATION

FACULTY ASSOCIATIONS or Staff Associations have taken a prominent part in bringing to public notice what they regard as defects in the structure of university government. They originated, like other professional associations, with the object of safeguarding and improving their members' salaries and conditions of tenure. But, partly to strengthen their position in these respects, and partly from more general considerations of university government and its supposed shortcomings, their main activity in most Canadian universities at the present time is to press for the faculty to be given a more powerful place in university government, at both academic and fiscal levels.

As the main advocate of constitutional reform, the Faculty Association is in many universities substituting itself (often of necessity) for a Senate that is not a truly representative academic body, or a General Faculty Council that is too big—maybe many hundreds in membership—to act effectively. But it tends to remain essentially a body of protest rather than of achievement—for the obvious reason that it has no constitutional standing within the university.

Several Faculty Associations proposed to us that they be given a form of constitutional standing by being officially designated as the electorate from which faculty representatives to the Board and other university positions would be chosen. We, however, have recommended expressly against this—for reasons which we feel are as beneficial to the Faculty Associations as to the universities.

First, we think it unwise to introduce additional bodies into the formal structure of the university unless existing organs are incapable of meeting the needs. If our proposed reforms for the Senate are adopted

it would be the logical body from which faculty actions relating to participation in university government should emerge. For the Faculty Association to play this role would result in emptying the Senate of the substance of many of its powers.

The Senate is also to be preferred because it embraces, by the representative principle, the entire tenured staff whereas the Faculty Association, as a voluntary society whose members pay a subscription, may or may not achieve a similar representative level. At some universities there are very large and very competent Associations, but at others the proportion of staff belonging and the quality of their membership are less impressive.

Finally, we suggest that the Faculty Associations themselves would prosper more without this compromising connection with university government. The fundamental concerns of staff associations with salary, tenure, and conditions of service are not at all affected by the reforms we propose. It seems clear that the Faculty Associations could pursue these goals more vigorously if they stayed completely outside the formal structure of university government.

Some Faculty Association leaders expressed concern that if the Senate rather than the Association were to be used as the main vehicle for the expression of staff opinion on educational policy, the Association might be reduced to a sterile salary pressure group concerned only with statistics. The frequently high membership figures and much of the vitality of the Association, they maintained, are due to their commitment to the broader values of higher education.

But there is nothing in our proposals to inhibit the continued pursuit of such broader interests. We urge merely that any Association proposals for the development of the university or for the modification of the university's structure of government be fed into the Senate as the official internal faculty forum. In most universities some of the leading members of the Association are certain to be elected to the Senate and to the most important committees. If the Association's ideas are good, they will undoubtedly be adopted by the Senate and sent on to the President and the Board as official recommendations of the faculty.

This is a more desirable procedure than the one which several Faculty Associations have recently tried. They have passed resolutions to the Board or demanded hearings from the Board on matters which the Board or President considered to be the exclusive preserve of official university bodies. The resulting impasse has served only to confirm each side's unfavourable impression of the other.

We found this thinly veiled mutual hostility present at too many

universities. "A President's position is made almost intolerable"—this from a President. "We are a faculty in despair"—this from a Faculty Association Chairman. Yet both were good men. The fault, as we earlier noted, lay not in them as individuals but in the existing structure of university government.

For example, the Faculty Association's normal role as a group pushing aggressively for better salaries, pensions, and so forth often means that at those universities where the Association is most successful, the Board and President are the most reluctant to consider sharing power with them. Yet it seems highly probable that faculty conduct is related to the context in which it occurs and that, if formally elected to represent their colleagues on the Senate (or, for that matter, on the Board), professors who may have used strong negotiating tactics on salary matters would react with a high sense of responsibility in their new role. (Particularly, of course, if it gives them access to necessary information which has previously been denied them.) Therefore, we ask Presidents and Boards not to underestimate the ability of the faculty to respond with tact and wisdom to invitations to share power. One faculty group reversed Lord Acton's dictum when it noted to us that "Lack of power makes peevish and absolute lack of power makes absolutely peevish." The obvious corollary of this is that shared power will make less peevish.

Unfortunately, this corollary may not hold true for all of the recipients of shared power, and faculties should be ready to deal with those of their number who persist in opposing the prospect of being "governed" at all. Such critics may look yearningly to the completely self-contained university envisaged in Paul Goodman's book, *The Community of Scholars*, but this model, as we have attempted to show, has little relevance to the broader problems of Canadian higher education today. Furthermore, if certain elements of the faculty remain unconvinced that total academic self-government is undesirable, the bare facts of the case—universities dependent on public money and serving a public interest of vast importance—should convince them that it is impossible.

If a minority of academics continue to harass the administration after the structure of government has been modified toward greater faculty participation, it will be up to the responsible staff to counter these obstructionists and to permit the duly chosen leaders to get on with the difficult task of governing the university. We acknowledge that more than once in testimony before us members of the Faculty Association spoke up to protest when one of their number went beyond the bounds of reasonable comment. We have every confidence that similar

responsibility would be exercised on a broader scale following university reform in the direction we have recommended.

We would also expect, incidentally, that following adoption of our suggested reforms, some Faculty Associations would cease their current practice of excluding from membership Deans and even those of their colleagues who are part-time members of the university administration. The gulf between faculty and administration needs to be bridged rather than widened, and it would be ludicrous to expel from the Association those whom they themselves (as *faculty* members, not Association members) had helped to choose. Some Associations extend membership to senior employees in the business operations of the university, and we strongly hope that this will become the general practice. It is most beneficial, as we noted earlier, for the administrative employees and the teaching staff to know and understand each other.

There remains to be considered one final point which has most relevance to those universities with staff recruited for the most part during the last few years. The problem in these cases is obvious: power cannot be shared until the shared power can be wisely used, and the newer faculty may lack the experience to use this power wisely. But, on the other hand, to exclude the majority of teachers from participation in the major university decisions is to discourage their sense of identification with the university and thus, perhaps, to accelerate the rapid turnover of staff which many Presidents naturally regret.

This problem is one which the Faculty Associations are peculiarly well placed to deal with because they are organized on the principle of equality among all members and hence are attractive arenas in which junior staff can voice their ideas. There is, of course, the danger of a possible split between a Senate dominated by the older minority of professors and a Faculty Association under the control of the more numerous younger staff. But we have tried to anticipate such a development by urging earlier that junior staff be widely involved in the governance of Faculty and especially departmental business, and that, in addition, they be kept closely informed of Board and especially Senate actions bearing on their interests.

Finally, approaching the problem from the other side, we would suggest that Presidents and Boards try to view their Faculty Associations as potential allies rather than as inveterate opponents. While Board and Association interests can be expected to conflict occasionally on such matters as appropriate salary levels, it seems obvious to us from the outside that both groups have the well-being of the particular

institution at heart. The Faculty Association is a *local* body with *local* roots and with aspirations to enhance the *local* university, in contrast to most of the other professional associations of the teaching staff which pull their loyalties horizontally to their fellow chemists, economists, and engineers in other parts of the country. If the Board will accept the kind of structure we propose and the Faculty Association will use the suggested channels for their ideas, we anticipate that their mutual interest in the well-being of the university will become more self-evident and that, in these more relaxed conditions, the Faculty Association will play its natural role of increasing the attachment of the junior staff to the university.

B. STUDENTS

OUR PURPOSE IN THIS REPORT, as noted earlier, is not to recommend *what* university policies should be, but rather to suggest ways in which these decisions could best be made. In the realm of student affairs we must make a further distinction: we concern ourselves with the relationship of students to university government and not with that of the university to student government. Thus, while we realize the great importance of such issues as student self-government, legal status for student associations, student participation in control of bookstore and cafeteria prices and of athletic programmes, we do not consider them to be within our charge.

The subject of the relationship of students to university government is one which has only recently received serious consideration. But we saw enough symptoms of student dissatisfaction with their self-perceived status as "customers" of the universities to know that there will be increasing demands made in Canada for their elevation to partners (albeit unequal ones) in the "community of scholars and students." Some variations of the Berkeley disturbances may possibly occur in Canada during the coming years. The issue, then, is not whether to welcome or stifle this new wave of student sentiment, but rather how to develop channels into which it can flow constructively.

Such channels within the university could be established on several different levels. For departments and/or Faculties, joint student-faculty committees seem to have worked well in the institutions where they have been tried. Normally the Department Chairman or Dean heads the committee and there is an equal number of students and professors.

The student members must be chosen in some fashion by their peers and not by the administration, for their independence in both fact and appearance is crucial to the success of their role. There is, of course, a danger that choosing students in this manner will produce intransigent types not amenable to rational dialogue. But this risk is greatly lessened if the joint committees are set up during a period when there are no student crises occurring on campus. (And their very existence will make such crises less likely.)

These joint committees should meet at least once a year, and preferably once a term, to discuss such matters as: required and elective courses in the major fields of study; relative merits of lectures, seminars, labs, tutorials; adequacy of library facilities; quality of teaching; and so forth. Discussions should be entirely candid with student suggestions receiving serious consideration and reasoned replies, even if they reflect immature thinking.

Students, for their part, must learn to use their new powers without abusing them. For example, there might occur instances in the future when students, armed with their ability to be heard, would demand the transfer or dismissal of professors for non-professional reasons. However, academic freedom, if it is to have any meaning at all, means the freedom to be wrong as well as to be right; and students who would ask for the removal of a teacher for his reactionary views are as wrong as the right-wing group that seeks the dismissal of a leftist professor. Reports from the several institutions which now have student evaluations of faculty teaching indicate that these have been very careful in their preparation, in a few instances "scientifically gathered," and have been most helpful to the Deans in making more appropriate assignments for professors not successful in teaching introductory courses.

At the university-wide level, questions arise about student relations with the Board of Governors and the Academic Senate. Although some student leaders insisted that only one of their own number could properly represent students on the Board, most young people to whom we talked were willing to concede that this was not a feasible proposal. There are a variety of possible objections: the rapid turnover in student leadership not only makes consistently high-quality representation unlikely, but when a gifted student leader does emerge he is prevented from acquiring sufficient experience to be a useful participant. Furthermore, questions of delicacy and confidentiality which come before the Board would effectively silence the student representative vis-à-vis his constituency and would, in effect, drive a wedge between him and his fellow students. There is also the not inconsiderable factor of the

additional time demands which Board membership would make on already busy student leaders.

We recommend that the plan which has been successfully employed at Queen's University and at the Scottish universities be generally followed. Under this formula, the students elect a Rector, not himself a student, to represent them as a full member of the Board. There is some question as to whether this representative should be a well-established figure, or a lesser known, perhaps younger, man; but in our view, his fame is less important than his willingness to accept at least a three-year term, to participate conscientiously, and to be easily accessible to the students for consultation and communication. Such a Rector should act as the articulate spokesman for student interests on Board matters that bear, even remotely, on student interests. As an example, he should suggest consultation with students *before* the Board decides to raise student tuition fees. The final decision may have to be the same, but if the necessity to raise fees has been carefully explained to the students ahead of time, mutual trust will have been greatly enhanced.

Proposals to add one or more student members to the Academic Senate seem to present fewer problems in principle, and the University of Victoria and several American institutions have already done so. The practice is too new for informed evaluation to be made of it. As an alternative or additional plan it has been suggested that students (not members of the Senate) be put on Senate committees relevant to student interests, broadly defined. (For instance, these committees should include not only the obvious ones dealing with libraries and scholarships, but also those which determine educational policies and admission standards.)

There will undoubtedly be times when it will prove embarrassing to have students present while faculty and administration are "washing the university's dirty linen" in the Senate or on its committees. But students, even under the present regime, hear distorted versions of these unpleasantnesses, and their reactions to them are much more likely to be constructive if they have been made realistically aware of the problems and, where appropriate, been invited to participate in their solution. Just as we have urged administrators not to judge faculty potential for responsible participation in university government by the occasional petulance which professors display when systematically kept in ignorance, so we suggest that students will respond with unsuspected maturity when treated as adults. Certainly the quality of the student leaders whom we met, French-speaking and English-speaking alike, was most impressive and Canada has good reason to be proud of them.

C. ALUMNI

WE FOUND ALUMNI PARTICIPATION in Canadian university government to be, by and large, of high calibre. There was little evidence of the stereotyped "old grad" who wanted a sports stadium instead of a better library. On the contrary, the representatives of the Alumni Associations whom we met seemed both devoted to and knowledgeable about the universities they were serving.

Nevertheless, there are grounds for concern about the mode of choosing alumni representatives on university bodies. (We are speaking here of alumni formally chosen by their Associations and not those who are put on university bodies by other means.) The most important selection process is, of course, that for the Board of Governors. Present practices vary but normally there are at least two persons named to the Board by the Alumni Association. In our view these representatives should be people of the highest quality who can participate conscientiously on the Board for at least a three-year term. Any more rapid turnover would prevent them from acquiring sufficient experience to be really valuable members.

A three-year or longer term does not necessarily rule out *ex officio* membership for leaders of the Alumni Associations, for they could continue on the Board even if their term of office had expired. But other considerations make it a questionable matter whether or not to adopt an *ex officio* pattern of membership. Perhaps not frequently, but often enough to make it a problem, Alumni organizations—like other mass-member bodies—fall into the control of a small, tightly knit group. These persons may be well-meaning but they tend to form a clique and appoint each other to the vacant offices. Certainly they are not representative of the entire membership. Furthermore, the qualities that make excellent Alumni leaders are not necessarily the same as those that characterize an outstanding Board member. (Of course the combination has often been successful, but the *ex officio* principle removes a safeguard against less successful appointments.)

We therefore recommend that a broadly based committee on nominations be elected at the same time as the regular officers of the Alumni Association and that this committee be charged with the task of nominating the very best qualified persons to serve on the Board. Although admittedly some individuals might be reluctant to accept nomination unless they were assured of being selected, the ideal procedure would be for the committee to bring in a slate of twice the number of posi-

tions to be filled. The ballots should then be circulated to all *bona fide* members of the Association.

Under existing constitutions the Senates of many universities include numerous seats for alumni. If our main recommendation about the Senate is accepted, i.e. that it should become a wholly academic body, there will no longer be seats for alumni. But if our other recommendation to create a University Court is adopted, the alumni membership of the Senate should be transferred to the new body. The representatives of the alumni on the Court should certainly include the Association leaders *ex officio*. For the remaining alumni members the committee on nominations could function in a manner similar to that described above for the Board.

Finally, we would like to emphasize an obvious but exceedingly important point. Alumni participants can be only as good as their state of knowledge permits. The Alumni Bulletin, therefore, should be published frequently and contain accurate recent information on university developments. Contrasting opinions should present different sides of important unresolved issues in educational policy. This journal is a prime factor in communicating university news to the outside world and care should be taken to see that this assignment is taken seriously.

D. PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

THE COMMISSION DID NOT investigate the relationship of professional associations to university government in any detail. Nevertheless, several incidents which came to our attention in the course of our Canadian visit prompt us to comment briefly on some of the problems involved in the use and misuse of accrediting procedures.

Let us begin by stating our belief in the general value of professional accrediting operations. It is essential that national standards be established to judge the quality of performance of a university's professional schools. Many changes which have resulted from accrediting pressures to upgrade facilities may have been badly needed. But whenever pressures such as these are brought into play, there is a danger to the proper functioning of internal university government.

The concept of balanced university growth rests on the assumption that the Board and the Senate can reach basic agreement on a set of priorities which they believe to be intrinsically valuable for the university. If accrediting pressures force the university to leapfrog certain

items to the top of the priority list, this will not only distort a carefully conceived order of things, it will also invite promoters of other low-priority projects to seek outside help to improve their prospects. As an example of this kind of power play, not far from the truth: the Dean of a professional school is asked to serve on an accrediting mission to evaluate the school of a university in the next province. At his urging the mission issues a near-ultimatum for great increases in expenditure on the subject in question; the Dean then promptly returns home to demand that his own university must keep in step. It is natural that a Dean should want to improve the relative position of his Faculty in the university budget, but his resort to an external fulcrum instead of his taking on the perhaps more strenuous task of persuading colleagues of the justice of his cause is not a healthy development. Presidents must firmly discourage this kind of conduct.

Realistically speaking, university policy will probably always represent an uneasy balance between doing those things which the institution wants to do within the limits of its resources and accepting those marginal projects which have been thrust upon it. We shall speak of other aspects of this dilemma in our chapter on universities and governments. As far as accrediting pressures are concerned, it is important for a university to develop certain defences which will help to preserve the uneasy balance.

For one thing, the President and the Board must provide firm leadership in calmly considering proposals for changes made by accrediting missions without being intimidated by the formidable power of the professional groups. The existence of an institutional long-range academic plan (see p. 32) can help to strengthen the university's resolve not to depart radically from determined priorities. If a provincial Master Plan exists, a broader perspective can be brought to bear on the balance between the need for these proposals and the financial ability to carry them out.

Finally, if these external pressures seem excessive, a university should carry the issue to a higher level of contention. Because most accrediting associations are national in scope, an individual university may feel essentially powerless to resist the threatened withdrawal of recognition. In such an instance, it should be able to call upon the combined strengths of Canadian universities in the A.U.C.C. which ought to have machinery to investigate allegations of excessive pressure and to recommend necessary counter-measures. This is admittedly a touchy business, but then the distortion of university policy by ultimatum from outside is a very serious matter.

Another problem which the A.U.C.C. should examine is that of occasional dictation of standards to Canadian accrediting groups by their American counterparts. The fact that many Canadians study and practise south of the border makes this possible, but it seems to us questionable that Canadian universities should be required to conform to a neighbour's standards when these may or may not be appropriate to federal and provincial needs and resources.

10. Universities and Provincial Governments

WE HAVE EARLIER EXPLAINED at length a university's need to maintain windows to the outside world. The provincial government is, of course, merely one of many outside forces interested in the universities; but it must be considered the most important since universities operate in a context of law determined by government and now receive increasing proportions of their income from governmental sources.

We note the recent report of the Bladen Commission *The Financing of Higher Education*, and accordingly we shall exclude from our examination the amounts of governmental aid and consider only the way in which the manner of bestowing government grants affects the processes of university government.

It is a widely recognized fact that, in Canada as elsewhere, the role of governments in higher education is increasing. There is a distinction to be made between the government's role vis-à-vis university autonomy and that vis-à-vis academic freedom. The two concepts are not synonymous, and the former must not be stretched so far as to rule out the government's need to ensure a policy of co-ordination among universities. The latter refers to the professional freedom of the individual teacher which must never be infringed. So much has been written about the professor's right to think, speak, write, and act as he feels bound to do in his search for truth that it should not be necessary to re-emphasize the point here. Happily, few governments in Canada seemed inclined to interfere with this precious right, but at one institution we noted a regulation forbidding its faculty to participate in partisan politics or to contribute to party funds. Such infringements of academic freedom are not merely unjust to the faculty concerned; they are flatly against the public interest.

It is this same public interest, however, which justifies the increasing role of governments in co-ordinating higher education. Provincial gov-

ernments, charged with pursuing the public interest and asked to supply increasing proportions of university income, will legitimately want to be consulted on the development of higher education in their jurisdictions. The British Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, by no means insensitive to the values of maximum university freedom, nevertheless noted in a collective statement to the University Grants Committee in 1946:

> . . . the universities entirely accepted the view that the Government has not only the right, but also the duty, of satisfying itself that every field of study which in the national interest ought to be cultivated in Great Britain is, in fact, being adequately cultivated in the university system, and that the resources which are being placed at the disposal of the universities are being used with full regard both to efficiency and economy. . . . The universities may properly be expected not only individually to make proper use of the resources entrusted to them, but also collectively to devise and execute policies calculated to serve the national interest, and in that task, both individually and collectively, they will be glad to have a greater measure of guidance from the Government than until quite recent days they have been accustomed to receive.

On the other hand, this does not mean that universities must slavishly accept every governmental suggestion. There will always be a tendency for public authorities to want universities to do more than they could undertake without distorting their fundamental purposes. Universities must therefore co-ordinate their responses to public need to see that proposed programmes are appropriate to their standards and rationally distributed among the institutions of higher education. The question, then, really is no longer whether or not to have co-ordination, but rather who will supply it and on the basis of what criteria.

Ideally, the universities long before the present would have undertaken this co-ordination voluntarily among themselves and there would have been no need for provincial intervention. A Carnegie report written in the 1920's recommending such voluntary action for the Maritime universities was largely ignored, and there is no reason to believe that a similar recommendation would have been better received elsewhere in Canada. For far too long the universities tended to operate as isolated units, at least as far as the planning of major developments was concerned.

When, on occasion, a university approached a government for supporting funds, the latter had no way of knowing whether or not the project in question was a legitimate one, and too often the decision to help or not to help was based on personal or political factors. The results of this patch-work method were unsatisfactory in many respects:

some provinces were over-subscribed in expensive fields like engineering schools; others were lacking in some of the basic attributes of a good university system, such as adequate graduate schools. Clearly, more order had to be introduced.

Although some responsible university leaders recognized this need, university presidents who were "winning" under the old rules were understandably reluctant to change, and thus self co-ordination among the universities became a serious goal only after provincial governments threatened to impose co-ordination on their own terms. Today the old order is rapidly changing. Wherever we travelled in Canada we found universities formally and informally co-operating with each other on a provincial or a regional basis. The thaw has begun and one president told us: "We're beginning to tell each other the truth for the first time."

But the question still remains: is it possible for these voluntary co-ordinating groups to do the necessary job and thus avoid the need for governmental intervention? We think not—first, because of the uneven degrees of effectiveness achieved by the voluntary groups, and secondly, because even if all were very good there would still remain certain problems which only governmental participation could resolve. We take up each of these points in turn.

A. PROBLEMS OF VOLUNTARY CO-ORDINATION

ALTHOUGH PROVINCES MAY DIFFER in the degree to which they need to do this immediately, we foresee the time when each province will have, or belong to, a formal co-ordinating organization. Already Ontario and Quebec have such bodies and the Maritime Provinces have the Association of Atlantic Universities. The Prairie Provinces and British Columbia have less formal regional consultation among Presidents, and the British Columbia universities also are working informally to co-operate within the province.

Only one of these, however, the A.A.U. in Halifax, has what we consider to be a vital component in any effective organization: an Executive Director of substantial stature. This man must do more than act as Secretary to the Council of Presidents (by whatever title called); he should bring to the Council matters which need its attention, aid it in setting up appropriate research studies, supervise the successful completion of these studies and, on the basis of their findings, recommend policy to the Council. While a Council would have no binding power

over its member institutions or over government policy, Council recommendations based on careful study should receive very serious consideration by all parties to the issues, including the government's advisory committee for university affairs.

It is important that the research studies be competently and thoroughly carried out. There are at least three ways in which the research staff can be assembled. They can be gathered *ad hoc* by the Executive Director on the basis of their specialized knowledge in a particular study area. Alternatively, a "research team" comprising different types of expertise can be seconded to the Council for a given period by the participating universities. Or finally, the Council can acquire a nucleus of permanent staff members engaged in research around whom can be built teams assembled by the first or second methods. The last arrangement is to be preferred, but it also costs the most money.

These Councils are normally financed by the participating universities, some of which may not welcome the prospect of creating a formal organization, naming an Executive Director, or employing a small independent research staff. Yet they would be wise to overcome their misgivings, for the universities' best hope for maintaining maximum independence of governmental control lies in their ability to take united stands on issues, based on careful and objective studies. If these voluntary co-ordinating organizations become, or are thought to become, elaborate defence mechanisms for the *status quo*, they will not succeed in fending off political influences.

Occasionally one or more Presidents who disagree with a Council study may disregard recommended procedures and approach the government directly to support their position. In such an instance, for the Council to survive as an effective mechanism of co-ordination some or all of the following responses should occur:

(*a*) The government should refuse to make any private arrangements with universities on matters that have been collectively studied. There must always be an appeals procedure available to aggrieved parties, but the normal channels for university business should be through the Presidents' Council (and/or the faculty group, to be discussed below) and the provincial advisory committee on university affairs. To proceed otherwise would be to destroy confidence in the advisory committee and the Presidents' Council and to encourage a return to the old days of "each for himself."

(*b*) The Presidents of the other universities should not acquiesce in this buccaneering, but should speak out firmly against it. This is more difficult to do when the offenders are powerful, but the rules have to be

uniform for everyone or they will lose their effectiveness. Just as presidents may expect (as we do) that members of the Senate will overcome the inhibitions of "senatorial courtesy" and, when necessary, criticize each other's projects, so the public should also be able to rely on the presidents to oppose each other's misdemeanors—at least behind the closed doors of the Council chambers.

(*c*) As an extreme measure, if neither the government nor the presidents can or will block frequent flouting of Council studies, the Executive Director (and any permanent staff) should seriously consider public resignations, complete with reasons. This is not a technique to be used casually, but the principles are grave enough to merit its consideration in extreme cases.

We welcome the existence of inter-faculty organizations paralleling the Presidents' Councils, provincial and regional. It is good for the teaching staff of diverse institutions to meet each other and to see their respective problems in broader perspective. The faculty groups should be consulted about, and might even participate in, Presidents' Council studies that are relevant to their interests (and these interests should not be too narrowly defined). Conversely, the faculty should keep the Councils informed of studies of their own which are germane to presidential interests. This does not mean that the two groups must always agree, but if there are issues in contention they should be discussed bilaterally first in order to reduce to the minimum the arbitrative tasks of the provincial advisory committee on university affairs.

B. PROVINCIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES ON UNIVERSITY AFFAIRS

HIGHLY EFFECTIVE PRESIDENTIAL and faculty organizations can greatly reduce the burdens of a provincial advisory committee on university affairs, but there will always remain certain things which only a government committee can do. In addition to the task of determining government grants, the committee must also try to evaluate provincial needs in higher education and then to reconcile presidential and faculty recommendations with these needs. Occasionally there will be disagreements within and between these two groups which will be passed on to the advisory committee for ultimate resolution. And finally, if no province-wide long-term planning has occurred (as we recommend below), the advisory committee should supervise its development.

Continuing government committees are functioning or have been

created recently in all multi-university provinces except New Brunswick, and there, in lieu of such a body, the Royal Commission chaired by Dr. J. J. Deutsch in 1960 made an *ad hoc* five-year plan for co-ordinated development. Even Alberta and Manitoba, where in certain senses of the word single university systems operate, have moved to create province-wide advisory committees.

The advisory committees already functioning are relatively small bodies with from three to ten members and with personnel drawn diversely from government, universities and interested third parties. The government appointees are often (though not always) active political figures and/or high civil servants from the fields of education and finance. The university appointees tend to be drawn from the ranks of presidents and members of the governing boards. Normally the government finances the committee's operations and the ministry of education provides it with staff. (Ontario has a separate Department of University Affairs while Quebec's education ministry has a special Division of Higher Education.) Some of the newer committees are larger and have more government appointees who are neither politicians nor civil servants.

None of the committees has operated long enough for its practices to be evaluated definitely. (The oldest—the Ontario Advisory Committee—recently improved some shortcomings by broadening its membership and strengthening its staff.) The following, then, are offered as general observations only and are not to be interpreted as criticisms of what we saw during our visits.

1. *Master Plan*

Each province which does not already have a long-range Master Plan for the development of its higher education over the next decade should embark on this project as soon as possible. (Some provinces may want to plan together on a regional basis.) As mentioned above, we recommend that the Master Plans be developed under the auspices of the advisory committees which are in the best position to integrate all the various strands of a good Plan. But the Plan should be the result of joint participation of all universities in the province with representation from the governing boards, the administrations and the faculties.

One observer has noted that:

> Master planning is relatively new in higher education, even newer than the co-ordinating agency which is now charged with its development and periodic revision. The characteristics which distinguish the master plan from most state surveys are the variety of subjects studied; the volume of data

collected; the depth of analyses; the integration of programs, budgets, and building priorities to provide a unity of purpose; the full inclusion of non-public institutions; and the means for step-by-step implementation of the plan, with simultaneous review and revision leading to the fulfillment of major goals.*

The detailed mechanics of master planning are not within the scope of this report; but planning has been mentioned here to illustrate one important way in which relations between universities and governments can be improved. The existence of a Master Plan can do for university-province relations what a long-term academic plan inside an institution can do for Board-President-Senate relations—that is, many of the strident overtones of *ad hoc* controversies can be lessened or eliminated when these difficult decisions are made in the context of basic guidelines upon which all parties have largely agreed. Obviously mutual agreement to a Master Plan does not come easily. But there is no task more important for an advisory committee than that of facilitating province-wide consensus on the necessary directions for future development.

The major and most urgent question in need of examination by a Master Plan committee is: "Shall there be some differentiation of function among institutions of higher education in the Province?" Subsumed in this question are many pressing issues:

(*a*) Should only a few advanced institutions be allowed to offer costly graduate programmes at the doctoral level while smaller universities are restricted to the bachelor's or master's degree? Or should every institution which aspires to such status be aided to develop doctoral studies and pursue advanced research in at least a few selected fields?

(*b*) Should additional campuses of existing universities be established, new universities be created, or a junior college system be brought into existence? Should higher technological institutions be developed? How should each of these segments be governed?

(*c*) Should each new institution attempt to pattern itself after the classic university model, in terms of faculty qualifications, course standards, and student admissions? (The shortage of qualified faculty over the next decade is going to make any smaller institution's attempts to upgrade the quality of its staff a difficult uphill battle. It might save a great deal of frustration, nervous energy, and internal upheaval to aim at a more realistic target.)

Different provinces will answer these questions in different ways. The

*L. Glenny, "State Systems and Plans for Higher Education," in *Autonomy and Interdependence* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1964), p. 35.

Parent Commission has made a comprehensive study of just such questions for the Province of Quebec. We shall not attempt to deal with particular cases elsewhere, beyond observing that where the minor campus of a provincial university is justified in seeking autonomy by an adequate range of studies, the existence of a provincial advisory committee on university affairs will facilitate the inter-university co-ordination which must follow in such cases. We do insist, though, that internal university government will be greatly affected by the nature of the choices made on these issues, and that the existence of a Master Plan covering these points can significantly ease relations between the provincial advisory committee and the universities.

2. *Advisory Committee Membership*

Although the advisory committees as at present constituted seem to have made a good start, we should like to comment, before custom becomes crystallized, that the typical Canadian advisory committee differs somewhat in the nature of its membership from the highly regarded University Grants Committee in Great Britain. It is doubtful whether university-government relations have matured sufficiently in any Canadian province for the U.G.C. precedent of having an academic majority on the co-ordinating body to be regarded as a viable model. But regardless of the proportion of academic members, we may call attention to the types of persons appointed to the U.G.C. First, the academic members tend to be practising and/or retired professors rather than administrators or Board members. These professors are chosen by the government on the basis of their qualification for representing academic values in general and perhaps certain fields of knowledge in particular, but definitely *not* to represent their institutions; for it is assumed that because they are unfettered by institutional responsibilities such as those carried by administrative officers or Board members they will be freer to subordinate the interests of their universities to overriding public needs.

Secondly, the non-university members of the U.G.C. tend to be interested private citizens of some stature rather than active political figures or career civil servants. (This is also true in the better American state co-ordinating agencies.) This gives them more flexibility in making their decisions than they would have if they felt bound by current government policies. If this practice were adopted, the government of the day would still have adequate opportunity to make its wishes known when the advisory committee recommendations are presented to the appropriate Ministers for review.

Let us stress that, aside from complaints of inadequate academic representation on some of the advisory committees, we heard no allegations that existing members were not doing a conscientious job. But with increasing pressures over the next decade as universities turn more and more to provincial governments for the necessary support, it is important to structure advisory committees in such a way that they can become the middle ground where government and university needs can be dealt with sympathetically and ultimately reconciled. The more flexibility the advisory committee can have in its delicate task, the better the results should be.

If a provincial Master Plan calls for the development of junior colleges and/or technological education, then the membership of the advisory committee should be broadened to include persons, academic and otherwise, who are familiar with these fields of education. The advisory committees will do a better job of planning higher education comprehensively if they are not the exclusive preserves of university-orientated persons. Furthermore, if the Minister or Deputy Minister of Education relinquishes his position on the advisory committee, in keeping with our comments above, it would be well to replace him with some person(s) acquainted with secondary education so as to provide liaison with that closely related field.

We would also hope that, with the gaining of experience and the building of mutual confidence between government and universities, the membership of the advisory committees could gradually move toward a majority of academics. For just as we have pointed out earlier to university presidents that it is good for them, the institutions, and the faculties that the professors should play a responsible major role in the creation and maintenance of standards, so we would urge governments to recognize that academics will accept the inevitable controls and fiscal austerities with better grace if they have contributed significantly to the decision-making process.

3. *Advisory Committee Research Staffs*

Although there is inadequate evidence on which to judge the competence of current research efforts, we nonetheless have some misgivings about the prospect of complex studies on the peculiar problems of higher education being carried out by regular staff members of the ministry of education. These officials may have both high ability and abundant goodwill, and yet because of their training and background may tend to employ methods appropriate to the secondary schools rather than to the universities. The latter are different, not just in degree

but also in kind, and as such require a research staff intimately familiar with the unique issues posed by higher education. We commend those provinces which have established separate Ministries or Divisions in recognition of this fact and hope that they will be able to recruit to them properly qualified personnel.

It is probably unnecessary to elaborate on the importance of a good research staff to the success of the advisory committees. The staff should work in close liaison with parallel groups of the presidents' and faculties' organizations and, where appropriate, joint studies should be undertaken to eliminate needless duplication.

4. *Provincial Grants*

We leave most comment on this subject to the Bladen Commission, but we should note in passing the impact of the annual grant system on the processes of internal university government. We were frequently told of the difficulties of creating and administering university budgets because so much time was consumed in preparing the annual requests and because the government's decision was generally made known so late in the academic year. Often presidents and governing boards had to make commitments on new appointments and buildings before the appropriations needed to back them up were legally authorized.

We realize that in the Canadian context it is unrealistic to think in terms of the quinquennial grants which, by and large, operate successfully in Britain. Changes are occurring too rapidly to permit five-year commitments; but we urge that serious consideration be given to triennial or at least biennial grants. (Certainly capital grants can easily be planned thus far in advance.) This would permit universities to form their budgets more slowly and carefully, allowing them badly needed flexibility in planning ahead. The quality of internal university government would undoubtedly improve accordingly. It is possible that requests for supplementary grants might occasionally have to be made in such a system, but British experience has shown that these can be handled with no great strain provided they do not occur too often.

Some academics expressed hopes that government grants might ultimately be given almost automatically under some formula system. It was presumably felt that this would take the sting out of government aid and reduce the dangers of poor judgment being shown by advisory committees. But formula grants present great problems:

Some formulae have now become very complex, with separate subformulae for academic staff, library, nonacademic personnel, physical plant maintenance and administration. In addition, a sliding scale of weights is often used

for budgeting the various levels of instruction, from freshman to doctorate levels. By considering a greater number of factors, the co-ordinating agencies attempt to make the formulae more objective, and hope to reflect the variety of programs and functions of the several institutions. *Experience has shown that formulae must be constantly re-evaluated to keep them timely and equitable and to reflect as accurately as possible the changing assumptions which serve as their basis.**

The establishment and periodic re-evaluation of grant formulae would most logically be undertaken by the provincial advisory committees, so that they would always retain certain discretionary powers. The best hope, then, for academics concerned about the maintenance of university autonomy would be to strive for an advisory committee with high quality members and then to co-operate with it in creating an outstanding Master Plan which would reflect university values.

Universities and the Federal Government

WE DID NOT INCLUDE the activities of the federal government relating to higher education as part of our charge since this field is restricted by the Canadian constitution to the provincial governments. The comments which we heard *en passant* indicated that internal university government is not significantly affected by federal programmes. Federally aided research has not yet become a threat to balanced university growth; and Canada Council capital grants posed problems only because of their insufficiency to meet vast needs.

*Glenny, "State Systems," p. 38 (italics added).

11. Universities and the Churches

IN CANADA, AS IN ALL the countries of Western Europe and in the United States, the churches led the way in setting up institutions for higher education, both colleges and universities. Almost all the older universities in Quebec, Ontario, and the Maritime Provinces began as religious foundations. But as universities grew, not only in numbers but in the range and costliness of new branches of learning, it became less and less possible for the churches to finance their universities without subsidies of public money. Subsidy usually involved a steady extension of public control. One way in which a denominational university has been able to accept public money and public control while still leaving scope for the primary purpose of the denomination has been for its Faculty of Theology to become a separate, privately financed, corporation, still on the campus, while the rest of the university becomes "provincial." For example, this has happened, with goodwill on both sides, at McMaster (formerly Baptist) and Windsor (formerly Catholic under the name of Assumption University of Windsor).

Some such plan might well be adapted within the group of relatively small denominational universities, both Catholic and Protestant, in the Maritime Provinces. In some of these the majority of faculty and of students do not belong to the controlling denomination. This does not seem to create internal difficulties. Indeed we felt that in those universities of this type which we visited there were happier relations between Board and faculty, and less of a gulf between the two, than was commonly the case elsewhere. This may be partly because they are smaller, and personal touch has been easier to maintain; partly it is because the clerical members of their governing bodies are felt by the faculty to appreciate the values for which a university should stand, and some of the clerical governors are likely to be ex-academics. But the denominational differences between the universities have certainly handicapped, up to the present time, any over-all planning or rationalization of programmes among the numerous small universities in this comparatively

poor region. We have commented elsewhere on the new hope of co-ordination afforded by the forming of the Association of Atlantic Universities.

It seems probable that no church-controlled university will be able to finance the expansions so urgently needed today without large grants of public money. Where this involves the yielding of its control, the church, as the founding father, should be given minority seats on the Board. And if it wishes, and can afford to do so, it can retain and finance as a separate corporation a Faculty of Theology on or adjoining the campus.

The Province of Quebec is a special case. In the first place, the provincial government has up till now left all public education, school and university alike, under the control of either the Catholic or the Protestant churches. Secondly, the Parent Commission has now made an exhaustive study of the whole field of education in Quebec, and has produced a report which includes recommendations for drastic changes in university government. All that we feel entitled to say, from our far less intimate knowledge of the local situation, is that the Parent Commission's recommendations for broader and more widely representative Boards, including members of the faculty, are entirely in line with the proposals of our own report. We have discussed in chapter 3 the advantages and disadvantages of the one-tier Conseil d'Administration found in some Quebec universities.

There are also church-controlled colleges affiliated to provincial and private universities all over Canada. These range from small colleges providing, for those of their students who are not studying theology, little more than residence and some tutorial supervision, upwards to the large units in the University of Toronto which are legally universities in themselves though holding in abeyance their own degree-giving powers; the latter have retained the right to appoint faculty and give all the instruction to their own students in a specified number of the main Arts subjects. The complexities of Toronto's constitution are so great that, as with Oxford and Cambridge, it would seem to need the intervention of a Royal Commission to simplify the structure. But that would be for the university itself, and certainly not for us, to request.

The typical affiliated college elsewhere is small, and teaches (*a*) theological students of its own church and (*b*) non-theological students, generally in Arts subjects only, and generally not beyond the level of a first degree. In a few cases these colleges venture into Faculties needing laboratories or into the field of graduate studies, and difficulties are apt to arise between these colleges and the university to which they are affiliated. The criticism, fair or not, is that by "biting off more than it

can chew" the affiliated college is tending to lower the university's standard. We feel that in the rare case where an affiliated college has resources and faculty capable of doing really good work beyond the first degree in Arts it would be wiser for it to seek independent status.

We formed a good impression of most affiliated colleges that we visited, especially where they were close enough to the parent university for their students to use such facilities as the university library. Relations between governors and faculty, and between faculty and students, seemed to be on a more personal basis than is possible in a very large university, and the result was a good community spirit. These small units cannot solve the major problems that beset Canada's universities. But we hope they will survive and flourish.

12. Conclusion

YOUR COMMISSIONERS HAVE ENJOYED the privilege of their opportunity to visit so many of the universities of Canada and to meet so many of the persons who serve them. It would have been a still more enjoyable though far more laborious task if our charge had been to evaluate their points of strength. As it is, our charge has been to explore possible weaknesses in the field of university government and to suggest improvements. This we have done, to the best of our ability.

Different universities, and different elements in a single university, may like some of our recommendations and heartily dislike others. But there is a sense in which our main proposals form an interlocking whole. For example, to create a strong representative academic Senate without providing it with adequate means of participating in university government could be explosive. Or again, to put faculty members on to the Board without drawing them from a responsibly elected Senate could lead to severe internal conflict.

Constitutional reform may improve a system of university government to a point but, in the last analysis, its successful functioning will depend more on the goodwill and mutual trust of the participants. That is why we have aimed in this report at creating a spirit of governance which is more than the sum total of our separate recommendations. It is fortunate that the achievement of this spirit does not require the elimination of disagreement within a university; for a university is so inherently, and rightly, a battleground of clashing ideas that no structure of government —not even a reformed one—could produce a cosy consensus. Academics, a tribe to which both of us belong, are not the easiest of men. It is their professional duty to think and to express their thoughts and they cannot be prevented from thinking outside the range of their own subject-matter. They are certain therefore to disagree, not only with each other but with those in authority, from their Faculty Dean upwards to the national government. But the academic often has one virtue cor-

responding to this defect (if it is a defect). His training should have taught him to disagree, even violently, without supposing that his opponent is a bad man. Disagreement within a university can therefore take place without loss of goodwill if channels of communication, consultation, and participation are open wide to receive the inevitable dissent and carry it to constructive outlets. It is healthier for disagreement to be expressed and argument to take place before decisions are made than for decisions *at any level* to be made "by authority" for fear lest previous debate would have a disruptive effect. Goodwill can be quickly restored after even a fierce argument. It is much more permanently eroded and destroyed by a system of authoritarian decisions.

This brings us to the topic of mutual trust. We visited some universities which, based on mutual trust between faculty and President, had a high degree of informal faculty participation in university government. We urge, in such cases, that the informal practices be made formal *now*, because if this action is postponed until a time of crisis, it will be doubly difficult to perform.

On the other hand, once such a reformed structure has been established, it is essential that the responsible officers be trusted and allowed to get on with the enormously complex task of university governance. One Faculty Association impressed us with their recognition of the need for "creative administration," a concept which implies the existence of sufficient discretion for the exercise of imaginative leadership. University administration, from Department Chairman up to President, may be only a means, a service to the actual ends of teaching and research; but few other tasks can match it in complexity, particularly in the upper reaches. A university President, for example, is subject to the vocal and insistent pressures of many constituencies: faculty, students, Board, alumni, lay public, provincial government, and others. If outstanding men are to be attracted to these positions, the faculty must be willing to extend its trust. On the other hand, the administrators' readiness to share power will be a key factor in the building of that trust by the faculty. If the delicate balance is caught, the spirit of governance that we mentioned will have been achieved.

APPENDICES

Appendix I

REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY ON EDUCATION IN THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC

(Extract from volume II, paragraphs 359–360)

359. UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION

(a) Faculty participation

The charters and statutes of the North American universities have in general erected an unfortunate opposition between administrators and teachers. Most of the universities on this continent are governed by an administrative council (often called a Board of Governors or Trustees) whose members by definition do not teach in the institution they administer; this is explained by the fact that formerly their function was principally—as it still remains in some universities—to raise funds for the university from private donors. This concept led to the result that the faculty body of these universities had no representation whatever on the central governing body, or administrative board, a situation based on the debatable assumption that members of the teaching staff are merely employees of the university. This creates an artificial and unfortunate cleavage between administrators and teaching staff, with danger of tension and misunderstanding; it is also a betrayal of the idea of the university, a body whose soul and spirit must reside in the members of its faculty. It is to be hoped then that this barrier will be broken down and that the teaching staff will be given a larger share in the administration of the university. Certain measures should therefore be taken in this direction. Thus it would be a good thing for members of the staff to be members of the central administrative body; they could express the point of view of the staff, make certain that educational and intellectual considerations are given first place in all decisions and act as a bridge between the executive officers and the teaching staff. Those to whom no one hesitates to entrust students and their education deserve to share responsibility for decisions which shape all university life. It would be equally fitting for members of the teaching staff to participate in the work of the budget committee, where decisions are made which directly affect instruction and research in every faculty and department. The appointment of the chancellor, the principal and other ranking officials should never take place without official consultation with the administrative council of the university, which will include members of the teaching staff among its members; in the same way, the appointment of a dean, if not the result of an election, must at least follow upon a mandatory consultation with the full and associate professors of the faculty involved. It would also be appropriate that the appointment

of a new professor require the approval of the full and associate professors of the faculty or department concerned. And, finally, the deans and heads of departments have an obligation to associate the entire teaching staff as closely as possible with major administrative and educational decisions. Various formulas of university administration should be tried out with all this in mind; the positive results which can be expected should encourage a daring spirit of innovation.

360. (*b*) *Student participation*

The philosopher Alfred North Whitehead used to define the university as a community of teachers and students united in the same search for truth. This community must make itself manifest in various ways—in instruction, research work, discussion, daily contacts and in mutual confidence. The teachers' attitude will, in the end, be the principal factor in creating and maintaining such an atmosphere. There will be every advantage in giving formal recognition to this community of spirit and of work in the administrative structures of the university. University students ask to be treated as adults, and it is fitting and fortunate that this should be so. Moreover experience has shown that there is little risk in extending confidence to them and in having them sit on various committees. In several universities there have recently been created, under different forms, "committees for student affairs." This is an excellent start for which we propose the widest possible application, even in the faculties. Just as in the case of the staff, student representatives, elected by their fellows, should be regularly consulted by the authorities of each faculty in the formulation of certain projects or of certain decisions with which the students are directly concerned. A considerable number of universities include the president of the alumni association as a member of the central administration board; no one has had the daring to grant students the same privilege. Many difficulties would be averted if the students felt themselves more closely associated with the administration of the various levels of the university and if they were kept informed of the difficulties and problems confronting their institution.

Appendix II

COMMISSIONERS' ITINERARY

(January to April, 1965)

January 29	Arrival in Montreal
February 1–2	McGill University
February 3–4	Université de Montréal
February 5	Sir George Williams University (JFD)
	Université de Sherbrooke (ROB)
February 6	Union générale des Etudiants du Québec
February 8	Dalhousie University
February 9 A.M.	St. Mary's University
P.M.	St. Francis Xavier University (meeting in Halifax)
February 10	University of King's College (JFD)
	Nova Scotia Technical College (ROB)
February 11	Université de Moncton
February 12	University of New Brunswick
February 15	University of Ottawa
February 16	Carleton University
February 17	Canadian Union of Students
February 18–19	Queen's University
February 22–24	University of Toronto
February 25	York University (JFD)
	University of Guelph (ROB)
February 26–27	McMaster University (JFD)
February 26	University of Waterloo
February 27	Waterloo Lutheran University (ROB)
March 1–2	University of Western Ontario
March 3	University of Windsor (JFD)
March 8–9	University of British Columbia
March 10	Simon Fraser University (JFD)
	University of Victoria (ROB)
March 11–12	University of Alberta: Edmonton
March 15	University of Alberta: Calgary (JFD)
	University of Saskatchewan: Regina (ROB)
March 16–18	University of Saskatchewan: Saskatoon
March 22–23	University of Manitoba
March 24 A.M.	St. John's College (JFD)
	St. Paul's College (ROB)
P.M.	United College
March 29–30	Université Laval
April 1	Memorial University of Newfoundland (ROB)

Appendix III

TOPICS ON WHICH RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE

(Our recommendations begin in chapter 4)

THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS

A. *Composition and Structure*

B. *Functions*

THE SENATE

A. *Composition and Structure*

B. *Functions*

THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP

A. *The President*

B. *The President's Administrative Group*

DEPARTMENT CHAIRMEN AND DEANS

EXTERNAL PARTICIPATION IN UNIVERSITY GOVERNMENT