In 1962 a British Broadcasting Corporation humour program carried a news parody of the Cold War in which the real battle was a cultural one. The Soviet Union had determinedly built up its cultural forces including its "intercontinental balletic missiles." In response the West had established bases across Europe to "act as spearheads of cultural retaliation." Although satirical in nature, as Frances Stonor Saunders reveals, the effort reflected a greater truth: that the world of culture was indeed a major Cold War flashpoint, and it was a battle the Central Intelligence Agency intended to win.

In The Cultural Cold War (originally published in the United Kingdom under the title Who Paid the Piper?) Saunders, currently arts editor at the New Statesman in London, presents a fascinating examination of what "our side" was doing to "our side" in the Cold War. In doing so her approach runs counter to the recent literary trend, celebrated in the right-wing media, which has focussed on the activities of Soviet intelligence in the West and the duplicity of national Communist parties.

Created in 1947 by the National Security Act, the CIA in its initial incarnation drew heavily upon elite American higher education institutions for the core of its employees. With an educational base broader than that of other intelligence services like the FBI or the RCMP Security Service (in the 1960s the agency boasted it employed enough analysts with PhDs to establish a decent sized university), the CIA took a variety of secret approaches to combatting communism. These ranged from sponsoring coups, to funding psychological experiments on unsuspecting patients, to pumping money into youth and cultural organizations.

It is the final group that Saunders' work focuses on. To spread the joys of American life to a suspicious or apathetic world, the CIA established the Congress for Cultural Freedom as a front organization, and used other fronts and legitimate associations to funnel tens of millions of dollars in aid of those who supported the cause. That cause was to discredit communism, while promoting the American way of life as an alternative. In its efforts, the agency was generally nondiscriminating when it came to ideology (with the one obvious exception). As long as they opposed communism, even left-of-centre groups could receive assistance. Indeed, in some ways they were preferred recipients, since their criticism of the Soviet Union had greater credibility than similar charges from the political right.

The secret efforts of the CIA extended into a myriad of causes. There was cash for a concert tour of Europe by the Boston Pops. Money and human resources flowed forth for the creation and maintenance of Encounter magazine, and financial support was funnelled into Partisan Review. Funding for the publication of numerous books was plentiful. Hollywood was also not immune from the CIA's attention. Through various routes, the CIA influenced the cinematic version of George Orwell's Animal Farm and 1984. A plan was even hatched to place more "Negroes" in the scenes of certain movies as a way of combatting Soviet criticism of American racism.

Although fascinating, many of Saunders' details are not new and in some instances have been in the public domain for decades. The difference is, and this is the true strength of her book, that she ties these various anecdotes into a coherent package and uses interviews with some of the participants to provide an insider's view. There is, for example, Tom Braden, a CIA agent involved early in the propaganda effort and better known to television viewers for his stint as co-host of the CNN talk show Crossfire or as the model for the father in the 1970s television series Eight is Enough. She also makes a convincing case that those academics and intellectuals, knowingly aware of the real purpose of these enterprises, frequently compromised their integrity and in specific instances helped to frustrate the very freedoms the Soviet Union was said to lack.

While the book is superb in its details, it is less comprehensive in exploring the motivation for the approach taken by the CIA. Saunders mentions the elitism but does not take this point far enough. Clearly, there was a lack of trust, even insecurity, on the part of those doing the plotting and manipulating. From their elevated perspectives, the agency and its hired hacks did not trust the often non-American masses to follow the seemingly proper and logical path.

It is this final point and the nature of the entire project that makes this book particularly relevant for the post-Sept. 11 world. In an effort to combat negative impressions of the United States held in large parts of the world, some praised the propaganda efforts of the CIA in the Cold War and called for an updated version. After the terrorist attacks, the U.S. Department of Defence proceeded to establish and then, after an outcry, disband an office for the promotion of strategic disinformation on behalf of the cause. As in the Cold War, it appears easier for the American state to use deception to win support instead of honestly assessing its own failings at home and abroad.

Steve Hewitt teaches history at the University of Indianapolis. His book, Spying 101: The RCMP's Secret Activities at Canadian Universities, 1917-1997, will be published later this year by the University of Toronto Press. For more information about his book visit www.spying101.com.