Academic Freedom and the Inclusive University evolved from a national conference held in April 1997 at the University of British Columbia. The conference was sponsored by UBC's president, the Alma Mater Society, the Graduate Student Society and the faculty association. The book contains 17 articles, divided into four parts: Clarifying Concepts in Ideology, Language and Law, The Changing Culture, Academic Freedom in Peril, and Theoretical and Practical Challenges to the Inclusive University.

Despite its title, the book seeks to tread the fine line between academic freedom and creating inclusive universities without formally taking a stand. The complexities of the issues are detailed, the debates unfold and readers are left to make up their own minds.

But the articles which comprise the book are uneven. Some are intellectually rigorous, some are provocative, and some use a series of cases while others use a single case study and draw sweeping conclusions based on rather scanty evidence. The strength of the book is that it brings together an array of incredibly diverse views on a highly contentious and politically charged relationship.

There are two principal weaknesses in the book. First, scant attention is paid to pedagogy and creating inclusive teaching and learning environments. Second there are oblique and, on occasion, direct references to responsibility and accountability, but nowhere is it spelt out whose responsibility it is to protect academic freedom and whose responsibility it is to promote inclusive universities. Both of these will be elaborated on below.

In Academic Freedom there is something for everyone. All sides of the inclusion/academic freedom debate are explored. The book begins with a lively, rich and textured debate by Stanley Fish who suggests "academic freedom is a way of thought that … elevates pettiness, boorishness, and irresponsibility to the status of virtue; evacuates morality by making all assertions equivalent and, because equivalent, inconsequential." (p. 3)

Academic freedom for Fish is a political weapon that "invites forceful agendas in, but only on its terms, and refuses to grant legitimacy to the terms within which such agendas define themselves." (p. 7) Given the logic of "reciprocal rights" academic freedom is simultaneously liberal in intent and highly illiberal in action. Thus he says "academic freedom is not a defence against orthodoxy, it is an orthodoxy." (p. 6)

Frederick Schauer, like others in the collection, suggests that despite appearances, inclusiveness and academic freedom are not necessarily in opposition. For Schauer the "privilege" of academic freedom as "exemption or immunity" has a corresponding social obligation and he is concerned that the protection of academic freedom as a right is not "free of social cost." (p.19)

For Lynn Smith the tie that binds academic freedom and inclusiveness is accountability - making and holding faculty members accountable to students and their colleagues. She does not see academic freedom and inclusivity as hostile and antagonistic; they are about rights and reciprocal obligations.

She says academic freedom is not an absolute right, that it must be understood in the context of evolving human rights legislation. This, Smith believes, is the intent of the CAUT Policy Statement on Academic Freedom which puts academic freedom in the context of social obligation and accountability: "Academic freedom carries with it 'the duty to use that freedom in a manner consistent with the scholarly obligation to base research and teaching on an honest search for knowledge.'" (p. 24)

She favours protecting academic freedom and promoting inclusivity though there will be significant challenges in sorting out the tensions between the two. The resolution of the tensions must entail an analysis of why academic freedom has to be protected and why equality must be promoted.

Even the most ardent advocates of academic freedom, over equity and inclusivity, suggest it is a hard won freedom that needs to be protected. The issue is not whether academic freedom is rooted in a philosophical tradition and has emerged from a chequered history. Rather, the issue more frontally is whether the current iteration of academic freedom as enjoyed by faculty in universities in liberal democratic market-based societies needs to be located within a social and political context.

If the answer is yes then the next question is how universities deal with the challenges and tensions generated by the competing values of academic freedom and inclusivity. How do universities reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable? Do we accept the view that academic freedom and inclusivity are reconcilable? Or do we accept the view that the inclusive university and academic freedom are fundamentally incompatible, and that inclusivity is highly corrosive of academic freedom and imperils the latter?

Jennie Hornosty's contribution locates academic freedom within the traditions of classical liberal theory with its focus on individual rights and the primacy of individual rights over group rights. The challenge of inclusivity then is a challenge to individual autonomy and individual freedom. Hornosty asks two critical questions: "Can the principles of diversity and inclusiveness coexist with academic freedom?" (p. 40) and, "What does it mean to talk of academic freedom in a class society with multiple layers of inequality?" (p. 41)

Within a liberal discourse there will invariably be conflict between academic freedom and inclusivity. However, all is not lost. Given that academic freedom does not exist apart from social relations and is, in fact, mediated and determined by institutional and structural arrangements, reconstituting the individual as a "social individual" as a bearer of rights who has obligations, is the basis on which Hornosty reconciles academic freedom and inclusivity.

John Fekete, on the other hand, not only suggests inclusivity and academic freedom are irreconcilable but that the inclusive university should be re-titled the "intrusive university." (p. 78) Once he has redefined the question, Fekete is comfortable suggesting academic freedom is under attack from governments, administrations, from some students and from some faculty. He even chides "sections" of CAUT for seeking to erode that for which it "fought so heroically in the past." (p. 80).

In this argument Fekete is joined by Graham Good who suggests the "categorization of people by race, gender and sexual preference" is a form of new sectarianism that does not create equality. (p. 84) The focus on group rights he says undermines individual rights which are the bedrock of academic freedom. Good argues "The new sectarian emphasis on feeling must be countered by a stronger emphasis on intellectual quest." (p. 93)

On another front, do we accept the premise of York University president Lorna Marsden that university culture is "strongly interior" and that debate within departments and in the senate is the strength of universities? This strength, she advances, is eroded and academic freedom is undercut by the threat of legal action and externally imposed "intrusive measures" in the form of equity and harassment officers. She advocates open debate over state regulation. Allowing harassment officers to take care of conflicts erodes academic freedom and allows "bureaucratic measures, so inimical to the creative freedoms of scholarship, to supersede legitimate and nonbureaucratic forums such as departmental and senate debates and decision-making." (p. 147)

Alternately, do we accept the premise of another university administrator that universities have a civic responsibility to be inclusive even though being inclusive will bring with it challenges and tensions? Bernard Shapiro asserts: "The special freedoms and privileges enjoyed by university communities are mechanisms that enable them to meet their social responsibilities." (p. 30) He identifies two challenges - first to recognize the positives that can emerge from conflict and social criticism and second to find ways in the face of ever increasing diversity, of sustaining a "secure learning environment for everyone." (p. 34)

Stan Persky asks us to reconsider the position advanced by some that the greatest threat to academic freedom comes from identity politics. He argues the greater long-term threat to academic freedom emanates from the marketplace as universities increasingly engage in entrepreneurial education and become increasingly enmeshed with the corporate sector. By "entrepreneurial education" Persky is referring to "revenue-generating projects that would increase the institution's fiscal independence." (p. 64) He does not extend his argument but it could well include corporate funding of research, corporate funding of chairs and the naming of university buildings after powerful corporate sponsors.

Diane Dyson seeks to draw out the lessons from a case involving a Christian fundamentalist student accusing a professor of harassment. "Liberalism," she suggests "tends to deal with clashing rights by creating a hierarchy of such rights" and universities tend to do so as well. Given such a hierarchy Dyson believes "academic freedom trumps equity issues." (p. 126) She proposes the development of a "new institutional model to address the varying effects of actions." A discussion of "impacts" she holds, "might enlighten the debate on rights" and highlight the importance of "responsibilities." (p. 127)

Marie Fleming suggests that mainstream feminist theory has not adequately addressed the challenges offered by "the experiences of women who do not share the socially and economically privileged backgrounds of the majority of the theorists." (p. 34) She cautions against allowing inclusiveness to degenerate into "debilitating relativism," but she is not prepared to "go so far as our Trent University colleagues who claim an academic 'right to offend.'" The yardstick for measuring a university is the degree to which it produces "inclusive knowledge" which she defines as knowledge "in the interests of all human beings." (p. 128)

Like others, Fleming remarks that the "liberal university has historically excluded certain groups from the production of knowledge." (p. 129) She suggests three avenues to pursue in establishing inclusive universities: transformation of institutional structures (the reduction of barriers to full participation by marginalized groups), promotion of a culture of openness, and production of inclusive knowledge. (p. 130)

Jennifer Bankier identifies significant academic values - equity, academic freedom, procedural or substantive fairness, and academic self-governance, and argues that it is a mistake to "ordain a fixed hierarchy of values." (p. 138) She suggests "the tensions and conflicts between academic freedom and equity can be reconciled" because both are "designed to address the reality and the legitimacy of differences among individuals and among social groups." (p. 140)

Dorothy Smith notes that what professors teach is regulated in a variety of ways and by a variety of bodies. Further, the discourse of academic freedom is used in a regulatory sense to "fend off" critiques. Thus to posit an "essential opposition" between academic freedom and the inclusive university suggests the discourse on academic freedom is not about "fending off" criticism per se. It only "seeks to inhibit … criticism raising issues of racism and sexism, particularly issues originating in students' experiences of departmental practices. The irony lies, of course, in deploying the discourse of academic freedom to repress." (p. 154)

Critiques of racism and sexism ought not to be seen as threatening the foundations of the academy, rather they are "better understood as fully at one with the university's commitment to rational dialogue." (p. 156) A climate of mutual respect, she argues, is the essential prerequisite for a successful academic debate and dialogue.

While the debate in the book is framed in terms of academic freedom and inclusivity, the structure of the debate actually masks what is really occurring - universities are in the midst of a profound social revolution which is prompting a "social order crisis" for them.

As more people from diverse backgrounds enter the academy first as students then as colleagues, they are demanding that the university address its organizational culture, its ways of doing things, how it hires and promotes, how it values scholarship, how it defines knowledge, whose knowledge production is valued and privileged, whose speech is protected, whose ideas are validated and deemed worthy of debate, whose voices are heard and how these voices are legitimated or de-legitimated. It would have been useful to see a contribution that situated the debate in the context of organizational change.

The most glaring omission in the book is that none of the contributors centred their discussion on pedagogy and inclusivity. Despite the varied contributions to the debate none of the contributors defined an inclusive learning environment. The teaching and learning enterprise is one of the core functions of faculty members in the academy. Thus any discussion of the inclusive university that does not deal with creating inclusive teaching and learning environments is widely off the mark. It is precisely in the teaching and learning environment that students from diverse backgrounds can, on occasion, experience first-hand the tensions between academic freedom and inclusivity. And sometimes they can be a significant party to the creative resolution of those tensions.

A second glaring omission is the identification of responsibility - whose responsibility is it to create inclusive universities? Who is Shapiro referring to when he talks of the university's civic responsibility? Is he referring to the administration and/or the faculty? Who takes responsibility for pursuing Fleming's three avenues to creating the inclusive university? Whose responsibility is it to undertake the transformation of institutional structures? Whose responsibility is it to promote a culture of openness? And who is charged with the production of inclusive knowledge?

It is one thing for Fekete to demand the protection of academic freedom, but who is responsible for its protection? At a micro level whose responsibility is it to nurture and create inclusive teaching and learning environments? There are multiple stakeholders in the university and each faces a unique set of pressures. In a rights-based discourse and in a complaints-driven system, it is the individual's responsibility to protect their rights. This includes the right of a faculty member to protest an infringement of academic freedom and the right of a student to lodge a complaint and request an investigation.

If the academy is committed to simultaneously protecting academic freedom and becoming more inclusive then there has to be a collective will to be proactive in dealing with the tensions that will invariably arise. As with any other process of organizational change, creating the inclusive university will have its detractors and will face pockets of resistance.

Universities are not the entities they were a hundred years ago. They have changed and they will continue to change. In addressing one of the weaknesses of the book, roles will have to be established and responsibilities assigned as universities sort out the relationship between academic freedom and inclusion. The question that is forcing its way to the forefront is whether faculty are prepared to constructively lead the change process or whether we will be bystanders endlessly engaging in debates.

If there is an overarching theme in the book it is that we have a much valued and cherished right. Let's use it wisely to challenge, not debase, to include not exclude, to lead not follow.

Anver Saloojee teaches in the department of politics and school of public administration at Ryerson University, and is a member of CAUT's Equity Committee.