NEGOTIATIONS UPDATE #4/1998 March, 1998 UNDUE PROCESS An earlier bulletin provided an overview of the proposals that management has put on the bargaining table. This bulletin is the first of a series that will address specific issues in more detail. We thought it appropriate to inaugurate this series with management's proposal for enhanced disciplinary powers, otherwise known as the "Nicolai Ceaucescu memorial clause" What exactly does management want? They propose to change Article 6.4 so as to give the president the power to suspend you, with or without pay. If the suspension is for four days or less, the decision is the president's alone and it takes effect immediately: i.e. the loss of salary appears on your next paycheque. If the suspension is for five days or more, the loss of salary does not happen until the full grievance and arbitration procedure has been completed. What offenses are these powers intended to punish? We don't know. Management's proposal provides no information; all it says is that disciplinary action shall be "proportionate to the seriousness of the specific violation." What "specific violations"? Your guess is as good as ours. Their proposal is completely silent on this point. Aren't there procedural safeguards? There are two. First, their proposal states that the decision to suspend you without pay "may be taken only by the president". (Now that should make you feel better!) Second, you can grieve the suspension under the complicated provisions of Article 30. Note, however, that if the suspension is for less than a week, you will lose salary immediately. Even if you are completely exonerated by the grievance process, you will recover your lost salary only months or even years down the road. Don't they require some kind of inquiry before suspension? No. Do you mean they want the power to treat academic staff as guilty until proven innocent? Exactly. Why do they want such powers? We don't know. Under the current Collective Agreement the president already possesses the power to suspend academic staff for cause; indeed, in certain circumstances he can make that suspension take effect immediately (see Appendix A, C14, p. 168). But when he does this the president is also required to respect the due process provisions of Article 30, including the obligation to treat you as innocent until proven guilty. And that means you don't lose your salary before you case is heard. What will happen if they obtain these disciplinary powers? Given the fact that we don't know what transgressions are to be sanctioned under these powers, it is difficult to answer. At the very least the exercise of these powers will generate a number of grievance appeals and arbitrations that are bound to be time-consuming and costly for both sides. We currently have one of the best records of all universities for avoiding expensive arbitrations. That will cease to be true, and CUASA will be obliged to pay 50% of the costs of all cases brought to arbitration. What is CUASA's position on all this? We honestly think management's proposal is a "solution" that is looking for a problem that doesn't exist. Our files show very few cases where the possibility of suspension has arisen. Moreover, under the present system, when allegations of misconduct are shown to be genuine, we cooperate with management and jointly negotiate an appropriate penalty. CUASA has never dug in its heels when faced with cases of proven misconduct. It is worthwhile to recall that we once agreed that an offence was sufficiently serious to warrant a two-year suspension without pay. That is hardly evidence of obstructionism on our part. A university environment contains many potential areas of conflict, both academic and personal. It is a mistake to give so much disciplinary power in these areas to one person. Would you like the president to suspend you without pay for a week for some alleged offence and be unable to challenge his decision without recourse to the full grievance and arbitration procedure?