REPORT
ON THE REVISED AUFA GREEN PAPER ON
RECRUITMENT
AND RETENTION OF FACULTY
On April
1, 2002 the AUFA Recruitment and Retention Committee, comprised of Soren
Bondrup-Nielsen (Chair), Vernon Provencal and Tanja Harrison, circulated the
AUFA Green Paper on Recruitment and Retention of Faculty (Professors,
Librarians and Instructors) (GPRR), and gave the
following Notice of Motion for the AGM (8-04-02):
“That the AUFA adopt, in whole or part, the
following recommendations of the Green Paper on Recruitment and Retention,
circulated as of April 1, 2002, as a basis for proceeding to the preparation of
a White Paper on proposals for possible bargaining positions on issues related
to recruitment and retention:”
The recommendations
of the Green Paper were appended to the Notice of Motion.
At the
AGM of April 8, 2002, the Recruitment and Retention Committee presented the GPRR. The paper was later revised by Vernon Provencal
according to the minute reporting motions carried on the recommendations made
in the GPPR for publication. It is principally these
revisions, with an abbreviated form of the paper, that appear here as a
report on the GPRR in the Communicator.
The aim
of the GPRR was to enable AUFA to move forward by
preparing a White Paper that will propose possible positions and language on
this issue to be brought to the table for the next round of collective
bargaining. After making certain changes to the recommendations of the GPRR, the membership of AUFA moved to adopt the report and
instructed the Executive to proceed on the basis of the Green Paper as revised
to prepare a White Paper that would make proposals for a bargaining position.
A White Paper should be brought forth next year for membership to receive and
discuss and then to adopt, amend, or reject the proposals.
I. Recruitment and Retention: what is at stake?
The
university is not a corporation, but neither is it immune from the
market-place. To render its services as an
academic institution, the university must hire and pay for administrators,
faculty and staff. To hire and to retain the best it can afford, it must make
its best offer. To the extent that faculty expect remuneration for their
services, we subject ourselves to the market. We compete for job opportunities;
universities compete for our services. We look for the best salary and the
greatest benefits, some financial, some non-financial; universities seek the
most promising candidates by making the most competitive offers. Problems with recruitment and retention arise
when a university finds itself unable to compete effectively in the
market-place: it cannot make an offer that can compete with other offers; it cannot recruit new faculty; it cannot keep
existing faculty. The problems of
recruitment and retention are a sign of institutional weakness that affects the
university as a whole.
II. Salary Incentives: the marketplace vs. the
collective grid.
The most
common proposal for a solution to the problem of recruitment is
salary-based: let the market determine
an initial salary offer via market differentials, usually met by way of initial
grid placement. But market differentials cause salary inversions, i.e.
inequities in the pay grid, which is based on seniority rather than market
differentials. Manipulating the collective grid to meet market-driven
problems of recruitment inevitably creates problems of retention: faculty
suffering the grid inequity of salary inversion threaten to leave if the
inequity created by market differentials is not corrected.
Recommendation
1: on Salary Incentives to Recruitment and Retention.
a) The
most equitable salary incentive is to bargain for an improved grid;
b) another
alternative is to adjust the grid to make it more attractive to junior faculty,
if this can be done without producing unacceptable inequities for senior
faculty;
c) the
grid inequity produced by market differentials limits their effectiveness as a
solution to the problem of recruitment, and should only be used in extreme
instances where other solutions are inadequate.
II.
Non-Salary Incentives: salary vs. benefits.
The
leading assumption that lies behind proposing salary-based solutions to the
problems of recruitment and retention is that since the problems are
market-driven, they are also salary-based. Our data suggests that the
problem of recruitment is not entirely salary-based; non-salary incentives are
equally important. Acadia may not offer the highest salary, but it
offers a low cost of living and a high quality of life. Acadia also offers the advantages of a fully
wired campus for teaching and researching, as well specific advantages for
researching in certain fields. Financial
benefits also help to reduce the cost of living and improve the quality of
life.
Recommendation
2: on Non-Salary Incentives to Recruitment.
a) improve non-salary financial
benefits such as health care (e.g. dental plan), pension plan, spousal job
opportunities, day care facilities, parking, facilities pass, etc.;
b) impress on potential
candidates the low cost of living and high quality of life to be found in the
Valley;
c) impress on potential
candidates the advantages of working within Acadia’s innovative environment,
and any specific advantages in their field.
Universities
cannot compete with the salary offers made by corporations; but neither can
corporations compete with the job offers made by universities to faculty.
Acadia offers a faculty position—with opportunities for teaching and
research—as well as academic freedom and tenure. The implication is not only
that Acadia’s marketplace is limited to other universities, but that the
academic marketplace is not driven by the same financial incentives as the
corporate world. What drives the university marketplace are the unique,
non-corporate, academic opportunities for teaching and research.
The
most commonly proposed non-financial incentive to recruitment of professors is
to reduce the teaching load for new professors and thereby increase their
opportunity for research. However, we do not want Acadia simply to become a
stepping-stone to a long-term career elsewhere.
Recommendation
3: on Academic Incentives to Recruitment
a) Reduce
professors’ standard course load from 3 to 2.5;
b) reduce
course load and increase research funds for new faculty;
c) increase
funds for professional development, research and travel for all faculty,
including librarians and instructors.
V.
Academic Incentives to Retention: research vs. promotion.
Under
the present system, academic promotions are tied only to incremental increases
and extensions in the salary grid; there is no relationship between promotions
and the primary academic incentives of teaching and research. Academic
promotions should be rewarded with entitlement to a reduction of the standard
teaching load and an increase in research opportunities by way of enhanced
research and travel funds. However, while research is essential for all
university faculty, some faculty prefer to give their teaching and/or teaching
innovation higher priority than research, and there should be increased
flexibility in striking an appropriate balance between research and teaching
and innovation.
Recommendation
4: on Academic Incentives to Retention.
a) Reward
promotions with entitlement to a reduction of the standard teaching load and an
increase in research opportunities by way of enhanced research and travel
funds;
b) recognize
the merit of teaching and teaching innovation by establishing clear and
flexible guidelines for promotion that will give proper weight to teaching and
teaching innovation.
VI.
Merit Pay as a Financial Incentive: individual vs. collective.
Merit Pay is defined as a financial incentive “to reward
exceptional performance.” The
problem with merit pay is that it engenders a factitious spirit dangerous to
collegiality and works against the principles of collective bargaining.
Furthermore, universities, unlike corporations, are society's stronghold for
impartial and disinterested research that is not necessarily marketable or
financially feasible. Academic integrity depends on independence from the
corporate marketplace and merit pay will, one way or the other, tie us to it;
for instance, it would enable the administration to set strategic initiatives
based on financial rather than academic considerations.
Recommendation
5: on Merit Pay as a Financial Incentive:
Despite its adoption into some universities,
merit pay is a corporate tool that should not be introduced into an academic
environment. It will be more harmful to
the collegial and collective culture of the university than helpful to the
individuals who it would benefit.
Vernon Provencal