POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF RECRUITING AND RETAINING FACULTY

In an earlier section I outlined the problems identified with recruiting and retention at Acadia. Here I propose a number of potential solutions; none of them are definitive. What I hope is that a constructive debate will ensue.

Some of the problems identified related to the rural location of Acadia. Well, this can’t be changed. Other problems concerned the tardiness of advertising and informing successful candidates; this can easily be solved.

A number of problems are related to heavy teaching loads and little time for research. Here there are a number of possible solutions. Teaching loads could be reduced across the whole faculty or we could do it disproportionately. For example, new faculty could have their teaching loads lowered until they become tenured. Faculty with research grants and/or those who supervise honours and graduate students could have their teaching loads reduced. This is indeed practiced in some Schools and Departments.

It has been pointed out to me that since Acadia is primarily an undergraduate university, it is ironic that research plays such a high role in promotion. Maybe we should recognize this and give faculty the option to focus on teaching. Some research is essential for a faculty position and hence the ratio of teaching to research could be split between 75/25 to 25/75 percent, decided upon by the individual professor. However, maximum teaching load in terms of number of courses taught should probably not be greater than the present level.

In terms of remuneration there are also several options. It is unrealistic that we will all get an increase of $10,000. But this is the minimum amount that new faculty in some Departments or Schools would like to be attracted to Acadia.

Often Administrations will give Market Differentials in order to recruit faculty. In fact, a Market Differential should be applied to a whole School or Department. However, this has the effect of creating inequities among Departments or Schools. Some faculty could be hired at higher grid steps; however, this creates inversions where younger members in a School or Department earn more than older members. So these options are not workable solutions.

It is possible to change the whole pay structure. Presently, the grid structure is such that as an individual increases in grid steps and moves from one scale to the next the cumulative salary curve gets steeper and steeper. In other words, early in one’s career, when you buy a house, maybe have children and have other expenses, you earn the least; whereas later in life, when the mortgage is paid off and the kids have left home, you earn the most (see below). It is quite easy to envisage a pay structure where the steep increases are early in one’s career without changing the lifetime cumulative earnings (see below). This scenario can apply to Librarians and Instructors, as well as professors. As an illustration, if we take the present grid structure for a professor hired on grid step 3 who spends 6 years as an assistant, six years as an Associate, and 18 years as a Full Professor for a total of 30 years, the life-time earnings would be $2,189,120. The starting salary would be $47,262 as an Assistant, $56,454 as an Associate, $66,918 as a Full Prof and in the last year the salary would be $98,213. Without changing the lifetime earnings it is easy to change the grid structure such that the equivalent earnings would be $51,725, $66,235, $73,747 and $83,471 (see below).

	Life time earnings
	PRESENT SYSTEM			NEW SYSTEM
Years		Salary	Cumulative	Salary	Cumulative	Difference in Cumulative salary.
1	Assis	47262	47262	51725	51725	4463
2	Assis	48933	96195	54150	105875	9680
3	Assis	50599	146794	56525	162400	15606
4	Assis	52267	199061	58850	221250	22189
5	Assis	53763	252824	61125	282375	29551
6	Assis	55189	308013	63350	345725	37712
7	Assoc	56454	364467	66235	411960	47493
8	Assoc	58300	422767	67690	479650	56883
9	Assoc	60145	482912	69115	548765	65853
10	Assoc	61990	544902	70510	619275	74373
11	Assoc	63837	608739	71875	691150	82411
12	Assoc	65681	674420	73210	764360	89940
13	Full	66918	741338	73747	838107	96769
14	Full	69075	810413	74511	912618	102205
15	Full	71232	881645	75251	987869	106224
16	Full	73388	955033	75967	1063836	108803
17	Full	75546	1030579	76659	1140495	109916
18	Full	77704	1108283	77327	1217822	109539
19	Full	79734	1188017	77971	1295793	107776
20	Full	81766	1269783	78591	1374384	104601
21	Full	83796	1353579	79187	1453571	99992
22	Full	85825	1439404	79759	1533330	93926
23	Full	87730	1527134	80307	1613637	86503
24	Full	89634	1616768	80831	1694468	77700
25	Full	91539	1708307	81331	1775799	67492
26	Full	93315	1801622	81807	1857606	55984
27	Full	95094	1896716	82259	1939865	43149
28	Full	96554	1993270	82687	2022552	29282
29	Full	97637	2090907	83091	2105643	14736
30	Full	98213	2189120	83471	2189114	-6

With this scheme there would be a huge benefit. One could pay off a mortgage in a substantially shorter time, as well as make investments in an RRSP and RESP from the day one was hired.

Such a scheme as outlined above, together with a good benefits package, should be very attractive to new faculty. It should also be attractive to the administration because over the lifetime of an employee the payout is the same as with the present system.

It is easy to think of a variety of problems. It would be expensive to change to such a system, older employees would suffer financially in the transition, and employees might leave Acadia when the increase in their pay cheque begins to level off. However, I think there are solutions to all of these. For example, as I have shown in the Analysis of the University Finances, a change of priorities could funnel more money to the salary envelope, a one-time bonus could be paid to older employees, and an employee would earn the greatest after 18 years when the opportunity to change jobs is small.

Finally, a further incentive to stay at Acadia and to “perform” at one’s best whether it is in teaching or research or both could be merit pay. This would have to be administered by AUFA just like promotions are through the URC. A fixed amount of dollars would have to be available, people would have to apply for it, and it should be awarded for a three to five year period.

In closing there are many possible solutions. Through discussions and debates, I am certain we, together with the Administration, can come up with equitable and workable solutions.

Soren Bondrup-Nielsen

President

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